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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *ajl*

SUBJECT: Attendance List for the National Security Council Meeting, January 5, 1982 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting which is scheduled for January 5, 1982, at 4:15 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (C)

The Vice President
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel

OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci

Treasury:
Secretary Donald T. Regan

CIA:
Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:
Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Agriculture:
Secretary John H. Block

Commerce:
Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

OMB:
Mr. David Stockman

JCS:
General David C. Jones
General Gorman

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Review on January 5, 1983

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 3/05/01

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White House:

- Mr. Edwin Meese III
- Mr. James A. Baker III
- Mr. Michael K. Deaver
- Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
- Adm James W. Nance
- Ms. Janet Colson

NSC:

- Dr. Richard Pieps
- Dr. Norman Bailey
- Dr. Allen Lenz
- Dr. Geoffrey Kemp

Approved ✓ As Amended


Attached is a proposed seating plan for this meeting. (U) ✓

Attachment
Seating Plan

THE CABINET ROOM

Colson

Kirkpatrick Block Stoessel Haig President Weinberger Carlucci Baldrige Stockman



Murphy

Jones Casey Clark Vice President Regan Meese Baker Deaver

Nance Pipes Bailey Lenz Kemp

DOOR

Mr. President, the Vice President has been chairing a Special Situation Group in meetings on Poland during our absence in California and may wish to provide an update.

The Vice President. Mr. President, if you will look under Tab C in the red folder of agenda papers, you will find a list of actions to be taken against the Soviet Union. I know you are up to date on all of these items, so that there is not much point in going through them again. However, if you have questions, we can try to answer them. The International Harvester issue, however, is one that we will be talking about separately. But, if you want to give a quick glance at the list -- do you have any questions on these other actions taken?

The President. These are the things we all talked about. Phase I - that is the things we are doing right now?

Meese. The Phase I and Phase II terms no longer have applicability.

The Vice President. The actions taken begin on page 1 with the Aeroflot item. The actions of Phase I and Phase II on page 2 have not been done.

The President. If we do nothing about (to stop) Geneva (INF) talks, should we refuse to set a beginning date for START talks?

Haig. I suggest we hold that decision in abeyance until I have met with Gromyko. At that meeting we will expect to set the date, depending on events. We should set a tentative date, but hold in abeyance the decision to go ahead.

The President. Isn't the special circumstances clause -- isn't that something that if you do it, there is no place left to go? Should we not wait with it?

Clark. Don Regan will cover that issue after we have an update on Poland.

Haig. (Update on events.) Mr. President, there have been seven key events that we should note:

- o Rakowski's trip to Bonn of December 31.
- o Gromyko's letter to me.
- o Jaruzelski's discussion with the EC-10 on January 4th.
- o Jaruzelski's reply of January 4th to your letter of December 23.
- o The Genscher role at the EC-10 on January 4th.
- o Schmidt visit today.
- o January 11th North Atlantic Alliance meeting.

First, Rakowski's visit to Bonn. Rakowski told Schmidt that Poland is being run by four civilians and four military. Rakowski said that a Western aid cutoff will lead to economic collapse of Poland and drive it into the hands of the USSR. He also said that Solidarity will have a role and the regime will keep Walesa and that the U.S. is too tough, but that "you Europeans are right" (in what they are doing). All this, of course, carried out the expected self-serving themes.

Second, the Soviet embassy delivered the response to my letter to Gromyko on January 2. It was somewhat more moderate in tone than Brezhnev's letter to you, ending with a plea to isolate US-USSR affairs from the Polish affair.

Third, in his discussion at the EC-10 meeting in January, Jaruzelski tried for a bridge between the UN and CSCE charters and Poland's martial law actions along the same line as the one Rakowski took in Germany. Martial law was justified by him under the UN and CSCE charters on the ground of precluding civil war. He indicated they will maintain a dialogue with the church and with Solidarity and that the U.S. economic sanctions will prolong martial law. He told the EC-10 group that one-fifth of the detainees have been released. He hinted at a desire to expel activists from Poland.

Fourth, your letter from Jaruzelski was moderate in tone -- soft line -- close to his December 24th speech. He indicated that the duration of martial law is dependent on the behavior of other activists. He has a clear strategy. He avoids polemics, and talks about U.S.-Polish friendship.

Fifth, Schmidt and Genscher. Genscher was the strongest advocate of the U.S. position at the January 4 EC-10 meeting. Cheysson was the weakest. The Greek delegate wanted to condemn the United States and Turkey for Turkish martial law. The British were good. The Italians superb.

It is important on this issue to be careful on our press comments. We might turn an East-West failure into a West-West failure, when in fact this is a failure of the Soviet system. Any time we criticize the Allies, we give a windfall for the Soviet Union.

On today's visit -- you brought Schmidt along all the way. You demonstrated leadership. He followed. It is less important that he support our sanctions than that he join in your statement. The communique was written almost totally here. He even added to it.

Again, we should bear in mind our exposure to scribes can turn the situation into a U.S., rather than a Soviet, failure.

In the EC-4, the French would not support the Germans and the Danish.

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The President. Is there evidence that Cheysson leans left?

Haig. Yes, he is a revolutionary. He had worked for the Algerians and Vietcong. To get his French citizenship back he had to join the army.

The President. Why don't we ask him to fly over here in a Lockheed Constellation?

Haig. The EC-10 is set for further consultations on the 15th of January. The Allies will not undercut our sanctions.

The President. Even Carrington sounded managed.

The Vice President. Isn't it fair to say that Schmidt was caught by the Honeker visit?

Haig. Yes, and he knows it. Yesterday I had a call from Cardinal Hefner of Cologne who carried a message from Archbishop Glemp. I gave that message to Schmidt in my discussion with him. I thought he would fall off his chair. There were four points:

First, the martial law decision in Poland came from a Soviet ultimatum, indicating that if it was not done, hard-liners would take over.

Second, the other Eastern European countries, less Hungary, were told of the ultimatum before the Polish government, so they could support it, which raises the question of whether the Soviets don't trust Jaruzelski.

Third, the Catholic Church has reaffirmed that the Brezhnev visit to Bonn and the Schmidt visit to the GDR were cover for the crackdown. This information also comes from people against Schmidt in the FRG.

Fourth, Glemp wanted us to know that the Europeans are soft -- that we are doing the right thing -- that the sanctions are good. Walesa is still supported by the church. He must be retained. The party tried to get him to negotiate, but he refused. He has set conditions that his 15-man board of advisors must be released to negotiate with him and that any negotiations should be held in a neutral place.

The President. Outside of Poland?

Haig. No, inside. However, the government has refused Walesa's conditions. But if we keep on the pressures, they may change (their position).

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The President. It sounds as if Jaruzelski is not a puppet, but is under the gun.

Haig. He is not a puppet, but is being used.

The President. His choice was them coming in, or . . . What do you do?

Looking at the sanctions, the financial one (the exceptional circumstances clause) seems more disruptive to our side. I don't say we won't do it -- let them worry!

On International Harvester, this one worries me: whom does it hurt more?

Baldrige. There could be three reasons to deny the export of the International Harvester plant: possible military use of the plant; the transfer of high technology; energy related advantages. It is not the latter.

If you wouldn't mind, Mr. President, at Tab B is a paper on the issue. We went to two armored personnel carrier manufacturers in the United States -- Allis-Chalmers and FMC. We took three or four days to get the whole operation broken down. The materials flow -- the processes, etc.

Without going through the whole thing, our conclusion is that there is no way to make an Armored Personnel Carrier in a combine factory. There is only 10-12 percent commonality in the tools that would be used. Thus, there is no military use possibility. There is no oil or energy involvement. Thus, that leaves only the high technology transfer issue.

Anyone who has worked on a combine knows it is not high technology. It shakes, rattles and rolls across the field. It has to be capable of being repaired by a farmer with a pipe wrench.

The International Harvester combine is only slightly better than what they can get from the German firm, Claas.

The license has already been granted. To be fair in treatment to International Harvester, we would have to have a reason to go back and reverse the decision previously made.

The President. Has the license been granted?

Baldrige. Yes, that makes it doubly important to be fair if we have to go back on our decision.

Weinberger. But conditions have changed. Poland has been invaded, albeit indirectly. All the actions by us assume that conditions have changed. To go ahead is inconsistent with these actions.

This (the International Harvester combine) is a unique design. It is an axial flow design -- different from the straw-walker design. It is 20-25 percent more efficient than Soviet machines. It has the largest harvesting capacity of any model made. Claas and others cannot provide the same technology.

It will be built at Taganrog as part of a large complex that also produces military items. The Soviet willingness to use hard currency to purchase it indicates the importance to them of the project. It will allow conversion of some existing facilities. The Soviets are now manufacturing about 12,000 combines a year.

DOD also sent technicians to evaluate the convertibility of a combine plant. They found the bay design and the floor strength right for armored personnel carrier construction. They build 85 and 115 millimeter artillery, land mines, rocket motors, etc., in the same complex. Everything in the USSR has a military convertibility.

The ability is there. The conveyor is convertible. If they build this facility, it will free up space for other production.

Then there is the political aspect. There is a problem with all these sales. By denying the pipelayers, we took a step. If we can't deny this, it gives them an increased capability at the very least. It helps them to harvest more efficiently -- it improves their economic conditions. This at a time when a few more pushes would contribute substantially to their economic problem.

The world sees good rhetoric from the US. But it sees that we won't do anything that hurts us.

International Harvester is in trouble, but I don't think the U.S. Government should help the Lockheeds, and the Chryslers and the others, and we should not help the Soviets after the drastic mid-December change in conditions.

To sum up, from our point of view, this is a unique capability for them. We can deny them an increased harvest capability. We can deny them an increased military capability. And we shouldn't make this sale because of the way the world will perceive it.

Block. There is too much concern here about the unique capabilities of the International Harvester equipment. There is nothing sacred about the axial flow capability. We had John Deere combines on our farm. They are not axial flow, but they worked just fine. The axial flow is not that great an advantage. I say, if they want to spend the money (for the International Harvester technology), that's fine.

Haig. Before the Polish thing, after a long Saturday meeting in November on this topic, I came away convinced we should let it go ahead. It was only in light of Polish actions -- given the need for signals -- that I put it in that group (items that might be cut off). But, Mr. President, you came up with a good, strong package. Whatever you decide in the long run, let's not dribble this one out now on an ad hoc basis. Let's put it in Group II. The time is past for initial signals.

The President. But what does this do to International Harvester, timewise? Cap, I still say if we had not continued to bail out the Soviets over all these years, if we had all stuck together, we wouldn't have the problems we have now. But we have them. But, on International Harvester, I find myself thinking, selfishly, does this (denying the transaction) hurt us more than it hurts the Soviets? Could International Harvester go belly up and throw people out of work? The moral thing is not of much use if the Allies go their own way.

Weinberger. But our Allies are seeking straws to avoid going along with us (on sanctions).

Regarding Al's point -- to wait on a decision -- this gives International Harvester the impression they can continue. Legally, we can lift a license anytime we want, but the International Harvester debt structure assumes this contract would go, although at least some of the banks probably have already discounted the possibility of this transaction going ahead.

It puts us in an impossible position to let this go, but to stop the rest of the transactions. And we (in DOD) continue to worry about the military capability.

The President. We are talking about a thing in the future, but after 60 years of crop failures, they have got to have something to put into these combines, or they are of little value to them.

Weinberger. They do produce a lot of grain. They got about 170 million tons this year. They need about 230 million tons. This combine improves their harvesting it. It will help them.

Baldrige. I cannot compete with Cap's eloquence. I'll have to work only with the facts.

Weinberger. That's not fair. (Laughter)

Baldrige. International Harvester has \$1.5 billion of debt to refinance over the next few years. It will have to pay \$500 million to banks up front. The Soviets will pay \$300 million for it -- a significant amount. The combine technology has no military use. I'm all for it (selling the combine). I rest my case.

Meese. To summarize, there are two key points. First, the cut-off date. We let other items in the pipeline go ahead. This falls in the "in the pipeline" category. To cancel this transaction would single out International Harvester for special treatment. We can justify that only if it has a military value or it is something they can't get elsewhere.

Second, they can get it elsewhere. They can get it from us or from the FRG. We should not hold this decision in abeyance.

Baker. International Harvester has been very frank with us on this transaction. They were in when the transaction was first considered. They said, if we suspend it -- fine, but give us a yes or a no. This argues for not holding a decision in abeyance.

Meese. We made a decision. I recommend we not go back on it.

Haig. Put this matter, like the grain embargo, for future consideration.

Baker. But not go back on the International Harvester decision?

Haig. Yes (that is correct).

Casey. Won't continuing the International Harvester give us a bad bargaining position at the COCOM high level meeting?

Haig. No, it will send a better signal (than disapproval) because this is not a high technology item.

Baldrige. Yes, continuing the license sends a good signal (to the COCOM group).

The President. It bothers me -- I wish we could go back in time (on policies on technology transfer prior to this administration) but we can't.

On this one, I can't bring myself to drive the last nail in the coffin of International Harvester.

Nance. We can turn now, Mr. President, to discussion of the "exceptional circumstances" clause.

Regan. Mr. President, you earlier analyzed correctly the situation on the exceptional circumstances clause. I think we have found another way around to accomplish the same goal.

At the G-5 (government creditors) meeting we can present our analysis of the Polish credit situation. Their situation has, of course, deteriorated. We can warn against extending further credits, including a Romanian rescheduling, which would bring them into default.

In addition, there is a January 17 creditors meeting to consider rescheduling of Poland's 1982 debt. Their 1981 interest payments have not yet been made. They have paid only \$100 million of the interest. The other \$250 million has not yet been paid. Thus, they are technically in default. At the conference on the 1982 debt we will say no (on rescheduling the 1982 debt) until 1981 is cleared up. This could force default and we could accomplish what we want without getting into the exceptional circumstances clause.

Baldrige. Accomplish what we want?

Regan. Yes, gradually choking off credit (to Eastern Europe and the USSR).

Baldrige. But not default?

Regan. No.

Carlucci. Would this affect the pipeline?

Regan. It could, but much of that is guaranteed by the FRG Government.

Haig. I'm not happy with the idea of choking off Eastern Europe's credit.

Regan. We are not doing it. We are showing how to do it.

Haig. We must be careful. This is a very major decision. It is NOT in our interest to pursue policies that keep Eastern Europe under Soviet control. We have committed to Schmidt to consult with the Europeans on rescheduling of the Polish debt. My point is, we don't want Romania to go bust. You are pursuing policies that will lead us in that direction.

Weinberger. The Soviets can't take over all the tottering economies of Eastern Europe. If they had to support them all, it would speed the day when their system would collapse. Regan is right: if you choke off credit they become undermined.

Haig. I suggest this is an issue for another meeting.

The Vice President. (Switching to another topic) I was disturbed by the Schmidt comment that cutting off high technology exports to the Soviets would not be helpful. We'll be in trouble at the COCOM meeting if he takes that stand. It seems to me that there is (educational) work to be done.

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Haig. From his comments during his visit, I was about to ask him if he had access to sensitive information from another power. I was equally struck.

Casey. The Germans have had a briefing from us on the impact of high technology transfer. They were impressed.

The President. Maybe he thinks they have already stolen everything and there is nothing left to get.

The Vice President. Yes, Schmidt talks as if the Soviets don't need our technology. He points out the Soviets were first in space, for example. We have a real serious problem (convincing him) and lots of homework to do.

Golan Heights

The discussion on the Golan Heights began at 1710.

Mr. Clark: Mr. President, it is now time to discuss the Golan Heights question and I am going to pass this over to Secretary Haig.

Secretary Haig: The Golan Heights question that we have to deal with, Mr. President, is the UN Resolution which is about to come up. Jeane will bring us up to date having spent the afternoon with a frothing Syrian. I did want to tell you that Begin, both in his meetings with Chuck Percy and in the oral message that an emissary delivered to me, has raised the white flag. They want to "cool it." They want to get into our good books. They have promised, essentially, that there will be no attacks on the Syrian missiles and no intervention into Lebanon unless there is major provocation. We have drafted a letter for you to Begin. We think we have played it right so far. Now we come to the question of sanctions. In the letter, incidentally, you are going to say that we will not support sanctions.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: I just spent an hour with the Syrian Ambassador to the UN. It was like being in a wind tunnel. He didn't even refer to Israel as a Zionist entity but rather a "crusader remnant" and said that that "crusader remnant" will be driven into the sea.

The President: Who is the Syrian representative?

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Ambassador Kirkpatrick: He is the author of the UN Resolution. This proposes sanctions. They want all countries to stop trade, exchanges and all communication with Israel. It is very clear that we will not agree -- that we will have to veto. We ought to try to deprive the Resolution of the nine positive votes it needs for passage, then we don't have to veto. We are working with Zaire and Togo not to vote positively. If they do and we veto, we veto. I appealed to the Syrian to think positively.

Secretary Haig: If we are going to have to veto, the wilder it is the better.

The Vice President: What will the UK and France do?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: If we veto, they may abstain.

The President: Maggie Thatcher has told me that their trade with the Arabs is very important and that this has her worried.

Mr. Meese: Because of the press, we better be sure we have some guidance. Is the guidance that we should say is that we are monitoring the situation and that it is our plan to vote against sanctions?

Secretary Haig: Well, let's wait until we know exactly what the Resolution is.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: Actually, we have seen the Resolution. It will be presented around 3:00 tomorrow at the UN.

Secretary Weinberger: What if it doesn't succeed? Will they submit another one?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: It is difficult to say. Syria is coming on very strong.

The President then concluded the meeting at 1720.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK PIPES

FROM: GEOFF KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Golan Heights Input for Minutes
of NSC Meeting Hel on January 5, 1982

Attached is my input on Golan Heights for the Minutes of
the NSC Meeting held on Tuesday, January 5, 1982.

Attachment

Golan Heights

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By as NARA, Date 3/05/11

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Review January 8, 1982

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BY hdt, NARA, DATE 11/1/05

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LOG #130147 #190155 RECEIVED 8/20/85 (S / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	A. Lenz to J. Nance, re attendance at NSC meeting (2 pp) GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/5/82	P-1
2. paper	re attendance at NSC meeting PART 11/1/05 M03-1289#1; Upheld 7/23/10 M1289#1	1/5/82	P-1, 33
3. NSC profile	#8290011 GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/15/82	P-1
4. minutes	NSC meeting [8290011] (11 pp) R 12/21/05 M05-016#19135	1/5/82	P-1 P-5
5. memo	G. Kemp to Dick Pipes, re NSC meeting minutes input [8290011] GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/8/82	P-1
6. paper	re NSC meeting minutes input [8290011] (3 pp) R 11/1/05 M03-1289#3	n.d.	P-1 P-5
7. NSC profile	#8190150 GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/4/82	P-1
8. memo	J. Nance to the President, re NSC meeting [8190150] R 11/1/05 M03-1289#4	1/4/82	P-1
9. agenda	for NSC meeting [8190150] R " " #5	1/4/82	P-1
10. paper	re NSC meeting [8190150] (6 pp) R 10/23/07 " #6	n.d.	P-1
11. memo	M. Baldrige to J. Nance, re technology [8190150] (2 pp) D 11/1/05 M03-1289#7	1/4/82	P-1 B3
12. memo	Lionel Olmer to N. Bailey, re technology [8190150] (2 pp) D " " #8	12/29/81	P-1 B3
13. memo	Secretary of Commerce to the Vice President, re technology [8190150] (2 pp) D " " #9	12/29/81	P-1 P-5 B3
14. table	re technology [8190150] (3 pp) D " " #10	11/11/81	P-1 B3
15. paper	re USSR [8190150] (3 pp) R 11/1/05 M03-1289#11	n.d.	P-1
16. NSC profile	#8190155 GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/4/82	P-1
17. agenda	for NSC meeting [8190155] R 11/1/05 M03-1289#12	1/5/82	P-1
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC (NSC Mtg. Files)			DSD
FILE LOCATION: NSC00036 05 Jan 82 Box 91283			4/7/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. NSC profile	#8190147 GUIDELINES CAS 3/5/01	1/5/82	P-1
19. agenda	for NSC meeting (with handwritten notes) [8190147] R 11/1/05 M03-1289 #13	1/5/82	P-1
20. paper	re talking points for NSC meeting (with handwritten notes) [8190147] (2 pp) R " " #14	1/5/82	P-1
21. paper	re table of contents for NSC meeting [8190147] R 7/23/10 M1289 #15	1/5/82	P-1
22. paper	re analysis [8190147] (6 pp) R 10/23/07 M03-1289 #16	n.d.	P-1
23. memo	M. Baldrige to J. Nance, re technology [8190147] (2 pp) D 11/1/05 M03-1289 #17	1/4/82	P-1 B3
24. memo	L. Olmer to N. Bailey, re technology [8190147] D " " #18	12/29/81	P-1 B3
25. memo	Secretary of Commerce to the Vice President, re technology [8190147] (2 pp) D " " #19	12/29/81	P-1 P-5 B3
26. table	re technology [8190147] (3 pp) D " " #20	11/11/81	P-1 B3
27. paper	re USSR [8190147] (3 pp) R 11/1/05 M03-1289 #21	n.d.	P-1
28. table	re USSR [8190147] (4 pp) R " " #22	n.d.	P-1
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC (NSC Mtg. Files)			DSD
FILE LOCATION: NSC00036 05 Jan 82 Box 91283			4/7/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a))

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b))

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

No Pages

6:05 pm

Per Bud 531 :

Per A Land

5:15-6:15

4:15-5:15

NSC Meeting
Jan 5, 1982
~~3:00-4:00~~ 4:15-5:15
Cabinet Room
CH: President

Subject: Poland - Dolan Heights*

Mary Ann VP: (4213) Terrie (Terris) Mary Ann Terrie
Sinda State: (632-5804) Tain (Sheila) Sheila Butson
Margaret OSD: (695-4325/697-3133) Margaret/Bob Meehan (Margaret) Margaret Meehan
Debbie JCS: (695-4824) Lt Col Buchnell (Col Buchnell) LTC Buchnell
 CIA: [Redacted] [Redacted] Keith Hansen LTC Buchnell
Diana OMB: (6190/6816) Judy/Diana Moore Margaret Diana
Cookie Treasury: (566-2394) Teresa (To Anna) Cookie Cookie
Tom Commerce: (377-5283) Lisa (Lisa) Lisa Lisa
Neal Agriculture: (447-3631) Marian (St Vivian) Karen Vivian
Ent-Eldson USUN: (632-8647) Jackie (Jackie) Jackie Jackie

Judy Pipes - Fran (Fran) Fran Fran Paula
Pat Bailey - Pat (Pat) Himself Himself
Himself Lenz - himself (himself) Himself Himself
Mess (Cynthia) Camilla 2235 Camilla
Baker (Margaret) 6797 Margaret
Deaver (Shirley Moore) 6475 Shirley

Agriculture
Sec John H. Black

OMB:
Stockman

Treasury:
Sec Donald T. Reg

* Kemp - Natalie

OSD:
Weeberger
Carlucci

VP:
Murphy

State:
Haig
Stoessel

JCS:
Gomez

OSUN
Amb Kirkpatrik

CIA:
Mr. Casny