

→ D Reg to file
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DI in DR (O/R) [in file]

The attached note was provided for me by Z, in the course of the weekend just passed, to arm me against any suggestion that the normal area effort (as distinct from the present, very much larger effort) against AR might have been less in scale than it ought to have been.

2. In the event the point
was not raised, and indeed
I hope it will not be —
though we certainly have nothing
to be ashamed of, quite the
reverse.

3. I have returned (via DI) the
attachment to Z.

yes
5/4.



Director.

Priority of Requirement for Intelligence on
Argentinian and the Falklands

1. The current JIC Requirements and Priorities paper is JIC(80)12 of May 1980, as amended by replacement of its annex in February 1981.
2. In both the paper itself ^{para 26} and the Feb 1981 annex, page 2 intelligence on the Falklands is linked with intelligence on Gibraltar (because of the presence of British troops in both) as the most important in the list of fourth priority requirements; the "subject" under which they are listed in the UK's residual commitments, which include Brunei, Kenya, the UAE and the New Hebrides! (Belize and Hong Kong are both third priority.) So the Falklands did not even rank with Cuban activities in the 3rd World, or Nuclear Proliferation, or Western European communist parties, which are other Priority 3 subjects.
3. In the JIC REP Subcommittee Catalogue of Requirements for intelligence on South America and the Caribbean (JIC(80)4 of 26/1/82), Argentinian "military, political and economic policies and intentions regarding the Falkland Islands; responses to the UK's negotiating position..... Internal political factors liable to affect

TS-UKFA



and general deployment
such policies: Capability of the armed forces" are all Category I
(But so are Mexican oil policy and Brazilian external debts).
I do not think an RFP Cat I trumps a JIC Priority 4!
The only mention of Argentina in JIC (80)12 apart from the
Falklands context is to put it on the near-nuclear short list
and therefore in Priority 3 in respect of Nuclear Proliferation.

4. We cannot be faulted - rather the reverse - in respect
of the intelligence response we have provided to this low
priority requirement from the JIC. Whether the JIC itself
was at fault in not identifying sooner the reality of the
Argentine threat on this occasion is, of course, another
question which may be asked by those not well-disposed to it.

AWJ:

Z 3/4.

P.S. We spoke. Para 7 of (80)12 says "all four
(categories) carry.... the requirement.... actively to seek the
intelligence so described".

A