

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE No. 44

0170 05/1144 09501197

FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE 050815Z APR 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON
TO MODUK SITCEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SIC A3A/A2M/I9F (INSERTED BY DCC)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TOKYO 050815Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 051000Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 5/4/82

AND REPEATED FOR INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.


YOUR TEL NO 63 TO ANKARA: FALKLANDS.

1. AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE MINISTER WERE

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UNAVAILABLE I SAW YANAGIYA, THE DEPUTY VICE MINISTER,
THIS AFTERNOON. I SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD TO NOTE THAT
THE JAPANESE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION BUT I WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE APPARENT LACK
OF ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT IN JAPAN ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS. I HAD ALSO HOPED THAT THE JAPANESE
WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP ON THE PERSONAL SUGGESTION WHICH
I HAD MADE TO THE VICE MINISTER ON 3 APRIL THAT THE
ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR BE SOMMONED AND TOLD OF THE SERIOUS
VIEW WHICH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TOOK OF THIS MATTER.
I SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT NOW, IN ADDITION TO MAKING A
PUBLIC STATEMENT AND CALLING IN THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR,
RECALL THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM BUENOS AIRES FOR
CONSULTATIONS AND STOP CREDIT TO THE ARGENTINES (PARA 5B
DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE OF JAPAN AS JAPAN DOES NOT F
EXPORT ARMS). I DREW ATTENTION TO RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS
BY THE PRIME MINISTER, BY YOURSELF, THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENCE AND MR LUCE. I STRESSED THAT WHILE WE SOUGHT A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION WE RESERVED OUR RIGHT TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER. IF WE WERE


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TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE

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UTMOST PRESSURE BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ARGENTINES TO FORCE THEM TO WITHDRAW.

2. YANAGIYA GAVE MEY OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY NISHIBORI, THE JAPANESE PERMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN MADE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO NEW YORK ON 3 APRIL IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH I HAD MADE THAT DAY. THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR SAKURAUCHI, HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD DRAW ON THIS F STATEMENT IN ANSWER TO ANY QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE IN THE DIET OR BY JAPANESE PRESS. YANAGIYA ADDED THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT THE LATEST REPRESENTATIONS WHICH I HAD MADE AND THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD CONSIDER CAREFULL WHAT FURTHER STEPS THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE. HE SAID THAT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES HAD REPORTED ON 3 APRIL THAT HE HAD SEEN THE ARGENTINE VICE MINISTER WHO HAD GIVEN HIM THE ARGANTINE VERSION OF EVENTS. HE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HAD IN ANY WAY TAKEN ISSUES WITH THE ARGENTINE VIEW.



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3. I NOTED IN MR NISHIBORI'S STATEMENT THE WORDS !!WE ARE THEREFORE AGAINST ANY USE OF FORCE, UNDERTAKEN ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS!! THIS ISAID CHIMED WITH OUR VIEWS. IF WE HAD TO USFORCE ITF WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR RIGHTS UNDER THE UN CHARTER AND IN THAT EVENT WE WOULD LOOK TO THE JAPANESE FOR FULL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ANY ACTION WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE.

4. I AM MAKING ERY EFFORT TO GET HOME TO THE JAPANESE THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACH TO THEIR ACTING AS RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN CAMP AND BEING READY TO !!STAND UP AND BE COUNTED!! I STILL THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE POLITICAL MESSAGE TO BE RAMMED HOME WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

CORTAZZI

BT

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