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CONFIDENTIAL

CWG327 Ø6/2146 Ø96C5424

FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE Ø61315Z APR 82

FROM COMMSEN FCO LONDON
TO GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR
MODUK
CINCFLEET

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY
SIC A3A/A2M/I9F

FM MADRID Ø61315Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 6 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)

MY I.P.T.

G BRALTAR AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

I THINK WE SHOULD REJECT PEREZ LLORCA'S FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE POSTPONEMENT MIGHT BE PRESENTED AS A BRITISH INITIATIVE, ARISING FROM YOUR PRACTICAL INABILITY TO COMMIT YOURSELF TO BEING IN PORTUGAL ON 2Ø APRIL. THIS COULD EXACERBATE OUR GENERAL DIFFICULTIES BY GIVING THE APPEARANCE THAT WE WERE REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE OVER G BRALTAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, A UNILATERAL SPANISH DECISION TO POSTPONE THE FRONTIER OPENING WOULD LOOK LIKE A DIPLOMATIC REVERSE FOR US. HENCE THE SUGGESTION THAT THE POSTPONEMENT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED AS HAVING BEEN DECIDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, TOGETHER WITH A FIRM ASSURANCE FROM BOTH SIDES THAT THE LISBON PROCESS CONTINUES.

2. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD SEEM BEST TO COMBINE THIS WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FIRM DATE IN LATE JUNE FOR OPENING THE FRONTIER AND STARTING NEGOTIATIONS.

3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

PATRONS
BT

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