

ENCL No.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE 060130Z APR 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON
TO MODUK
CINCFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY

SIC A3A/A2M/19F

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL

FM WASHINGTON 060130Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (PERSONAL FOR S OF S)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1132 OF 5 APRIL 1982

MY TELEGRAM NO 1123: FALKLAND ISLANDS
PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

1. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WE MAY HAVE HERE WITH OPINION BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC. I AM DOING WHAT I CAN TO MOUNT A MAJOR PR EXERCISE TO EXPLAIN WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHAT WE ARE INTENDING TO DO. AT SOME STAGE WE SHOULD HAVE HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE USEFUL FROM THEM IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HAIG AND STOESSEL WOULD, I KNOW, LIKE THIS BUT OBVIOUSLY YOU WILL WANT TO TAKE STOCK BEFORE COMMITTING YOURSELF ON SO VITAL A MATTER.

2. IT IS WORTH BEARING IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HAIG WILL BE GOING TO JAMAICA AND THE BAHAMAS LEAVING WASHINGTON ON 7 APRIL. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE A SOUND LINE WITH THEM ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION FOR THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD WELL BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT THE JAMAICAN AND BAHAMIAN PRIME MINISTERS SAY TO HIM.

3. MIGHT I SUGGEST THAT AS SOON AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN AFTER TAKING OVER IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE YOU SHOULD CONSIDER SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO HAIG WHICH COULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING SORT OF POINTS:

AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO MEET BEFORE TOO LONG:

A REFERENCE TO THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND TO YOUR INTENTION TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH HAIG ABOUT IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

A STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL BE CONTINUING THE POLICY OF THE PREVIOUS FOREIGN SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT AND THAT AS HE, HAIG, WILL KNOW, CARRINGTON'S RESIGNATION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF ANY DIVISION OF VIEW WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT POLICY, HOWEVER MUCH THERE WAS ARGUMENT WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY:

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SOME ASSERTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH WHAT THE USA SAYS AND DOES IS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE:

WE ARE NOT ASKING THEM TO TAKE SIDES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE BUT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS IF EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY A GRESSION SEEM TO BE CONDONED BY THE USA IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE:
THEREFORE WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE USA AS OUR CLOSEST ALLY WILL TAKE WHAT OPPORTUNITY THEY CAN TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON THE ARGENTINE TO WITHDRAWJC
BECAUSE IT IS OUR DETERMINATION TO RESTORE THE FORMER ADMINISTRATION TO THE ISLANDS BY WHATEVER METHODS ARE NECESSARY.

HENDERSON

BT

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