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DIRECTORATE OF  
22 APR 1982  
NAVAL PLANS

2038/1/2

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
SECRETARY OF STATE

1. The Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the outline plan (1) submitted by CINCFLEET for Operation SUTTON. A copy of the plan is enclosed.
2. We have invited the Commander of the Task Force to take account of the need to obtain early tactical intelligence; the potential of his Sea Harriers for reconnaissance and offensive support as well as air defence; the probable availability of Vulcans to bomb the airfield at Port Stanley; and the need to develop a concept for follow-up operations after the initial landing.
3. Our presentation to OD(SA) tomorrow will seek to give Ministers a clear picture of the factors which would be crucial to the success of this operation and the scope and timing of decisions which must be taken.

21st April 1982

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Enc.



Note:

1. CINCFLEET's C3 dated 19 April 1982.

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104

OPERATION SECTION

OUTLINE PLAN

1

AIM

INTRODUCTION

1. To land a force in the FALKLAND ISLANDS with a view to repossessing the islands.

LIMITATIONS

2. Civilian Casualties. Civilian casualties must be kept to a minimum.
3. Civilian Property. Safeguarding civilian property is a lesser but important consideration.

ASSUMPTIONS

4. SOUTH GEORGIA has been retaken and a protection force has been established there.
5. An effective sea/air Exclusion Zone has been established around the FALKLAND ISLANDS.

FACTORS

RELATIVE STRENGTH/COMPARISON OF FORCES

6. Maritime/Air. The UK Task Force with its embarked aircraft has a clear superiority over the Argentine Fleet in terms of morale, weapon systems effectiveness, training, tactical expertise and afloat support. The main threats to its survivability are posed by the 2 modern Type 209 coastal submarines, and from mainland based attack aircraft particularly West of the Islands. However if PORT STANLEY Airport were to be extended this threat would be raised accordingly. Operation could be successfully conducted in the Eastern sector of the Exclusion Zone where the threat is more limited and hence more easily containable; local sea control and air superiority could be established to allow an amphibious landing on EAST FALKLAND.

1 of 14

SECRET

UK EYES A

The degree of local sea control and air superiority that could be achieved in the Western sector would be insufficient to guarantee the security of prolonged amphibious operations.

7. Land Forces. Given good tactical intelligence from advanced force operations, the UK Amphibious Force has the capability to effect an amphibious landing with minimum casualties, if mounted outside the areas of the major concentrations of Argentine defences. With their greater tactical mobility provided by the additional helicopter forces assumed in this paper British forces can successfully counter Argentine forces which are expected to be deployed forward. Having achieved a landing, British forces are sufficiently strong to maintain a beachhead. Morale will be a significant factor. Argentine morale and ability to resist are likely to deteriorate as the blockade continues. British morale will suffer if the landing is deferred overlong.

#### WEATHER

8. General. The weather in the FALKLAND ISLANDS is variable and changes rapidly. Stormy weather is frequent in late April and winter sets in in mid-May. Prevailing winds are Westerly. Mean speeds are of the order of 15 knots and exceed 21 knots for 60-70% of the time. Gales occur on 5 days per month. Day temperatures in April/May are 40°F dropping to below freezing at night. Wind chill factors are high. Rain falls on 15 days each month; snow occurs on 10 days a month in June but rarely lies for long. Visibility is generally good below an overcast sky with cloud bases 1,500-2,000 feet; breaks in cloud occur at night.

9. Deductions. With the onset of winter the weather will:

- a. Pose morale and survival problems for troops in the open, especially on high ground. This should favour seasoned, well trained British troops.
- b. Lead to Argentine deployments being concentrated in the immediate area of settlements, particularly PORT STANLEY, where accommodation exists for troops not deployed in the field.

- c. Make amphibious operations more difficult, particularly on exposed coasts.
- d. Severely inhibit parachute operations.
- e. Limit daylight satellite and air reconnaissance.

#### LOITER CAPABILITY

10. Long periods at sea will have a debilitating effect on embarked troops, particularly in rough weather. After a period of about a month South of ASCENSION the fighting efficiency of the Landing Force would be significantly degraded; it would require about a week of shore training to regain its fighting efficiency.

11. The environment in SOUTH GEORGIA, which is only 3 days passage from the FALKLAND ISLANDS, is more suitable <sup>than Ascension Is</sup> for the acclimatization of troops, but ashore and at sea it can be very hostile. Therefore although SOUTH GEORGIA is 8 days closer to the FALKLAND ISLANDS than ASCENSION or ST HELENA it should only be considered a suitable loiter area for a limited period.

#### ACQUISITION OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

12. Forces available to gain Tactical Intelligence include:

- a. Eight SAS and eight SBS patrols embarked in the Task Force, and three further SBS patrols embarked in CONQUEROR which is presently committed to Operation PARAQUET and will therefore not be available in the FALKLAND ISLANDS before 3 May.
- b. Sixteen SAS and three SBS patrols committed ashore to Operation PARAQUET and therefore not available for Operation SUTTON before 3 May.

13. Landing Options. Unpredictable winds may rule out parachute operations

and the only submarine which can deploy SBS patrols in the timescale of this plan as CONQUEROR. Sea Kings are therefore the most practicable method of inserting SAS and most of the SBS.

7 14. Time Scale. Advanced force reconnaissance operations and planning will take up to 15 days to complete. This allows time for insertion, advance from the landing point to the objective area, reconnaissance, reporting and subsequent planning. Detailed study of activities covered in this period is in hand.

15. Endurance. Intelligence gathering patrols will have an endurance of up to 14 days, after which exfiltration or resupply will be required if they are to remain effective.

16. Photographic Reconnaissance. Photographic Reconnaissance may also be available.

#### ADVANCED FORCE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

17. Forces Available. Advanced force offensive operations could be carried out by:

a. Fresh troops in the Task Force

b. Special Forces previously committed to Operation PARAQUET which should be available on completion of Operation PARAQUET and could be available in the FALKLAND ISLANDS on about 3 May.

c. Special Forces already committed to advanced force reconnaissance operations in the FALKLAND ISLANDS; however these would be tired and would need-resupply for any major task. It is assessed that these forces would be best employed ~~by~~ receiving, briefing and guiding fresh troops to the objective area.

d. Special Forces at present in the UK and not currently committed to this operation. These would require to be embarked in the Amphibious Group at ASCENSION.

18. Tasks. Advanced force operations may be carried out against a limited number of prime targets such as air control radars, enemy chipping in harbour, PORT STANLEY airfield or enemy headquarters, or may be directed against a larger number of small targets, to cause the most widespread disruption to the enemy. Naval gunfire support could be available for offensive support.

#### OPTIONS FOR BEACH AND HELICOPTER LANDINGS

19. The following tactical considerations must be taken into account when selecting the landing beach:

a. Naval. Sheltered waters should ease the landing and reduce the submarine threat. Conversely naval operations may be affected by limited sea room and the effects of terrain masking on ships' sensors. The threat from mining may also be increased.

b. Military. The beachhead must be established in an area from which effective military operations can be developed. It is assessed that this restricts the main landing to EAST FALKLAND.

20. Possible Landing Areas (see map at Annex A).

a. PORT SAN CARLOS Area. The approach from the FALKLAND SOUND is well charted, though restricted and dominated by high ground. The area is satisfactory for beach landings by LCUs, and by ISLs in AJAX BAY. Overland exits to the East over bad ground through the hills are very poor. Helicopters could land throughout the hinterland.

b. PORT SALVADOR. This is an area of creeks with narrow but well charted access; LCU landing is possible in the creeks on the Eastern side in conjunction with ISL landings on the North coast beaches at CAMPA MENTA or SFAL BAY; there are high cliffs behind these beaches and fair exits.

Overland routes are fair, but are canalized at the PORT LOUIS Isthmus. Helicopter operations are possible throughout the hinterland, although they could be hampered in PORT SALVADOR by local weather conditions.

- c. PORT STANLEY Area. Beaches in and to the South of BERKELEY SOUND have not been considered because of their proximity to the anticipated main enemy position at PORT STANLEY.
- d. GOOSE GREEN and DARWIN Area Approached from the East. The isthmus is a key point politically and for island communication. Approaches from the East through CHOISEUL SOUND are constricted at DARWIN NARROWS. The North shore has beaches in accessible inlets but the hinterland is virtually impassable to vehicles and very difficult even on foot. On the South shore LCVP and possibly LCU landings may be effected in VICTORIA HARBOUR. However the route around to the North of the island, although over good ground, is severely restricted at the BODIE CREEK bridge. The ground is firm and very suitable for helicopter operations.
- e. EGG HARBOUR. The approach from FALKLAND SOUND is restricted but well charted and ISL beaching is possible with good exits. The routes inland are favourable for Land Rover traffic, being over flat and firm terrain, but there is little or no cover. Helicopter operations would be possible throughout the area.
- f. PORT SUSSEX. The approach from FALKLAND SOUND is restricted but well charted and ISL beaching is possible with good vehicle exits. The hinterland is rugged but there is a restricted Land Rover route to DARWIN along the coastal strip. The area is suitable for helicopter operations.

satisfactory landing points for the Amphibious Force. Those in FALKLAND SOUND and CHOISEUL SOUND lack sea room. The PORT SAN CARLOS area is confined by high and rugged ground to the East, so that mobility would depend on helicopter operations which may be restricted by weather. The PORT SALVADOR area and adjacent beaches offer a satisfactory landing and deployment area with sea room to the North but routes off the peninsular are canalized. Final decisions on the optimum landing area cannot be made until further intelligence and subsequent study have been achieved.

### TIMINGS

22. Movements. A bar chart showing the planned movements of major units is at Annex B.

23. Earliest Date. Selection of earliest landing date is affected by:

a. Advanced Force Operations. The earliest date that Special Forces could be inserted is 29 April when HERMES arrives in the operating area. Allowing 15 days for reconnaissance operations and subsequent planning the earliest possible date for the main landing is 14 May.

b. INTREPID. HERMES must remain configured for Harrier operations and unless the Land Force Commander can accept a slower build-up rate an additional helicopter operating deck is required. INTREPID can be made available for this task which would also allow greater flexibility in beach selection with the faster build-up that can be achieved with her additional landing craft. Her earliest arrival date at the FALKLAND ISLANDS is 14 May and she then needs two days to integrate with the Task Force.

24. Latest Date. Intensive flying operations cannot be sustained for longer than a month. Assuming that this starts at the end of April, on arrival of the carriers in the FALKLAND ISLANDS area, and that a seven day period of



intensive flying will be required after the landing, the latest date for the landing is 23 May. The question of loiter time is not relevant to selection of the latest landing date.

25. Factors Affecting the Selection of Landing Date

a. Operational. Morale, weather, troop fitness, political directive and military judgement all strongly combine to favour an early landing date. There is enough time between the arrival of the Battle Group and the earliest landing date for local sea control and air superiority to be gained and for the airfield to be neutralised. The Amphibious Group will be reinforced on or about 10 May by the arrival of 2PARA in MV NORLAND and considerable aircraft reinforcements in SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Conversely a later landing date allows time for the EDATS Trawlers to join the Task Force. However, in view of the limited capability of these vessels to reduce significantly the probability of an assault vessel being mined in shallow water, and the relatively small chance that the selected beach approaches will have been mined, it is considered that this factor should not influence selection of the date for the landing.

b. Logistics

(1) The Task Force is self-sufficient until July. Re-supply will be required by the beginning of June to maintain an adequate safety margin against action losses.

(2) War Maintenance Reserves (WMR). The Task Force has WMR for 20 days at anticipated consumption (1.5 times limited war rates). Allowing 19 days for the sea passage from UK to the FALKLAND ISLANDS, resupply should present no problem provided that the first vessel leaves the UK not later than D Day.

(3) Deduction. Logistic factors do not affect selection of the date for the landing.

26. Preferred Date. A landing could take place in the period 14-23 May.

It should be as soon as practicable after INTREPID's arrival and her preparation for landing operations. The preferred landing date is therefore 16 May.

OUTLINE PLANMISSION

27. To land a force in the FALKLAND ISLANDS with a view to repossessing the islands.

EXECUTION

28. General Outline. A strong and sustainable British presence ashore will be achieved by landing 3 CDO BDE RM augmented by two parachute battalion groups (about 5500 men) on or about 16 May. The Force will establish a bridgehead close enough to exert direct military and psychological pressure against the main Argentine force in the PORT STANLEY area. This may be enough to convince the Argentines that their own position is militarily untenable, and that they can honourably agree to withdraw, but the possibility that the enemy may advance for a decisive battle must be allowed for in selecting the position for the bridgehead. Operations which contribute to achieving and sustaining the British presence ashore are covered in the following paragraphs.

29. Deception and Diversionary Attack.

Is it?  
a. Strategic. A strategic deception plan is being co-ordinated by MODUK for Operation CORPORATE.

b. Tactical. Tactical deception is necessary to disguise the exact timing and position of the true amphibious landing. Some or all of the following gambits should be co-ordinated to achieve distraction and disguise:

(1) Deceptive grouping and routing

(2) Communications jamming, spoofing and simulated security breaches

- (3) Interference with shore air navigation radio aids and IFF.
- (4) Use of Chaff, flare drops, diversionary bombardment and underwater acoustic deception to suggest a false beachhead.
- (5) Diversionary attacks by Special Forces before D Day

30. Advanced Force Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is to be carried out by Special Forces at the earliest opportunity.

31. Offensive Operations by Advanced Forces. Advanced force offensive operations will largely be carried out by Special Forces specifically inserted for the task and they may be assisted by advanced reconnaissance forces.

32. Sea Control

a. Anti Surface Vessel Operations. The effective deployment of Argentine surface vessels is dependent on air reconnaissance. Rules of Engagement to allow early destruction of shadowing aircraft will be given. Authority will be given to attack Argentine air and naval forces conducting operations outside the Exclusion Zone which threaten British forces and landing operations.

b. Anti Submarine Operations. Similarly Rules of Engagement will be issued to allow all enemy submarines carrying out threatening operations to be sunk.

c. Mine Warfare. The mine threat should be countered by operating SSNs and surface vessels outside the 100 metre depth contour, and by reconnaissance of the selected beach approaches.

33. Achievement of Local Air Superiority.

a. Against Mainland-based Aircraft. TF 317 will be authorised to destroy all Argentine aircraft which threaten our forces in the area. Disruption of

enemy reconnaissance, Command, Control and Communications should be highly productive.

b. Neutralisation of PORT STANLEY Airfield (PSA). Argentine use of PSA and its surveillance radars constrains all our operations, enables redeployment and resupply of Argentine forces and maintains Argentine morale. Neutralisation by any possible means including SAS, SBS, bombing or naval gunfire against the radars and other 'soft' installations is authorised provided that reconnaissance has established that this can be done with minimal risk of British civilian casualties. The timing of this operation is at the discretion of CTG 317.8; the balance of advantage appears to favour carrying it out as soon as possible after the Battle Group's arrival in the Exclusion Zone, if this does not prejudice other operations, particularly intelligence gathering.

34. Enforcement of the Exclusion Zone. Argentine forces must be denied freedom to carry out air and sea operations anywhere in the Exclusion Zone. However, it should be most rigorously enforced in the air and sea approaches to PORT STANLEY so that the blockade is completely effective and convinces the enemy that their position is militarily untenable.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

##### 35. Command

- a. Operational Command of TF 317 is retained by CINCFLEET
- b. Operational Control of TG 317.8 is delegated to FOF1 as the Commander Combined Task Force.
- c. Operational Control of the Amphibious Task Unit may be delegated to COMAW as Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Comd 3 Cdo Bde is nominated as the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF). Subject to

the overall authority of COMAN, responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore is vested in Comd 3 Cdo Bde RM.

d. When the landing force is established ashore Tactical Control of the landing force will be delegated to Comd 3 Cdo Bde RM as Commander Landing Force.

e. Operational Control of assigned SSNs is delegated to FOSM as CTF 324. Opportunities may arise for SSNs to operate in Associated Support of CTF 317.8.

36. Codeword. The codeword of this operation is SUTTON. The codeword is RESTRICTED and its meaning SECRET UK EYES BRAVO.

#### SERVICE SUPPORT

37. Provisions. Without resupply the present afloat provisions will sustain the force until late July.

38. Naval Stores. Primary source of supply is from the Combat Stores Ships and MATCONOFF.

39. Fuel. Diesel, FFO and aviation fuels will be provided by dedicated RFAs with resupply back up by freighting tankers and RAS-capable tankers taken up from trade.

40. Medical Stores. Adequate medical stores are contained within the Task Force with re-supply provisioning for casualty contingencies.

41. War Maintenance Reserve (WMR). The Task Force presently has WMR sufficient for 30 days of landing force operations at limited war consumption rates. To allow for increased intensity operations resulting in higher than expected

consumption, reprovision of a further 30 days W:R stocks will be despatched from the UK to reach the operational area by D + 20.

42. Prisoners of War. Instructions for handling Prisoners of War will be issued.

**Annexes:**

- A. Outline Map of the FALKLAND ISLANDS
- B. Planned Movements


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UK EYES A

ANNEX A

OUTLINE MAP OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS





Serial	Units		April		Insertion of Special Forces	May		Earliest Landing	Preferred Landing	Latest Landing
			M T W T F S S	M T W T F S S						
			19 20 21 22 23 24 25	26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23						
1	TU 317.8.2	BRILLIANT SHEFFIELD GLASGOW COVENTRY ARROW APPLELEAF	@ 12 knots		FI	EZ				
2	TU 317.8.1	HERMES INVINCIBLE GLAMORGAN BROADSWORD ALACRITY YARMOUTH	@ 15 knots passage		EZ		Exclusion Zone Ops			
3A 3B 3C	TG 317.0 TG 317.0 TG 317.0	FEARLESS SIR GALAHAD SIR GERAINT SIR LANCELOT SIR PERCIVALE SIR TRISTRAM	At Ascension		Passage - 11 days at 13 knots		FI			
			At Ascension		Passage @ 13 knots		FI			
			At Ascension		Passage @ 13 knots		FI			FI
4 *	2 PARA in NORLAND		UK Passage 'direct' @ 19 knots + 1 day		FI	Freetown				
5	EDATS Trawlers		Portland		@ 14 knots,		FI			
6	INTREPID		UK 18 knots		Asc	FI (1)				
			UK 20 1/2 days @ 14 knots + 1 day in Ascension		EZ		FI			
7 **	Special Forces		Advance Force Rocce Ops (3)		L Day					
8	ATLANTIC CONVEYOR		Devonport 14 1/2 days @ 20 knots +		FI	1 day ASC or Freetown				

9	ROULEMENT	ARGONAUT ARDENT REGENT AO	10 days @ 15 knots      ASC      FI
10	TF 317.9 TU 324.3	ANTRIM PLYMOUTH ENDURANCE TIDESPRING CONQUEROR	Operation PARAQUET      Approx Release Date

Remarks

\* Fuelling stop at FREETOWN not confirmed

\*\* L Day: Launching of advanced forces from Task Group

## KEY:

UK = UNITED KINGDOM  
ASC = ASCENSION ISLAND  
EZ = EXCLUSION ZONE  
FI = FALKLAND ISLANDS

(1) = hoarding for Assault