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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CHRON FILE

April 28, 1982

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER Qem

SUBJECT: NSC Minutes

Attached are the minutes from the NSC meeting on April 27, which dealt with NSSD 1-82, Part III, Sections D through G.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve these minutes.

Approve     *Qem*     Disapprove                       
*for*

Attachment

Tab I NSC Minutes, April 27, 1982

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By MJA NARA, Date 8/24/99

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME April 27, 1982; 2:15 p.m.-3:15 p.m.  
& PLACE: Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: NSSD 1-82

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Under Secretary Fred C. Ikle

DCI

Mr. William J. Casey

OMB

Mr. David Stockman  
Mr. William Schneider, Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs

USUN

Amb. Kenneth Adelman

JCS

ADM Thomas Hayward  
LGEN Paul F. Gorman

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Mr. Michael K. Deaver  
Judge William P. Clark  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. Kenneth Duberstein  
Mr. Richard G. Darman

NSC

Mr. Thomas C. Reed  
COL Allan Myer  
COL Michael Wheeler

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By M75 NARA, Date 8/26/06

Minutes

President: I would like to express my appreciation for the outstanding efforts of everyone who was involved with this study. I want to assure each of you that your efforts have resulted in one of the most significant and meaningful statements of US national strategy. More importantly, this study will undoubtedly serve as the basis for the national security of the United States for the remainder of this century. As important as this effort is, I recognize that it is but one part of our overall national strategy, and I ask that each agency devote the same energy and resources to other ongoing strategy studies which characterize this study. I also want to take time here to thank Bill Clark and Tom Reed for the efforts they have put into this endeavor.

Judge Clark: The President has read all nine segments of the study as they were produced. At the NSC meeting on April 16 there was general consensus on the first five parts. Today we will consider the last four parts. On a personal note, now being closer to the facts, security assistance has taken on new meaning and importance for me, and we will have some discussion today on where we need to go in the area of security assistance. The President does plan to spend some time this week on security assistance matters. Finally, I want to point out that this effort will impact the national security of the United States for the remainder of the century.

Mr. Reed: At the last National Security Council meeting on the 16th of April, we considered the first five segments of NSSD-1, which set the foundations of a national security strategy. Part I, which discussed the world environment, looked at the Soviet threat, concluded that both the Soviet Union and the United States have problems, and there is a potential that the decade of the '80s will be the decade of resolution. The first part of the study also sets forth our national objectives; an active but prudent program to encourage the dissolution of the Soviet empire. It also set forth the interlocking set of strategies that must execute our national objectives: economic, political, diplomatic, informational and military. We agreed on the nature of the Soviet threat, and concluded that it posed significant dangers to the Free World. We considered the role of our allies and friends, and we found that our relationships with our allies and friends are indispensable. Finally, we set forth some regional military objectives and theater priorities.

Today we will look at the specific forces and attempt to answer the question of what are we going to do about the problems we face and the objectives we have. I will also describe what is new in this study as opposed to the Carter program.

Section D, Strategic Nuclear Forces, states that nuclear deterrence is our most fundamental national security objective. It acknowledges that the US no longer enjoys superiority or parity and therefore there is great danger to the US and our

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allies. We must fix this condition, we must achieve parity, and for the United States this is our first priority. Mr. President, in October you adopted the strategic forces modernization plan, which was codified in NSDD-12 which implicitly spurred the TRIAD and provided a very high priority to C<sup>3</sup>I. You also adopted the concept of flexibility for strategic reserves and that was codified in NSDD-13. This section says get on with it, essentially as promulgated last Fall, and do it in a balanced and steady way. What is different about the treatment of strategic nuclear forces in this section as opposed to the last administration? I would say the answer has three elements: First, we are going about it in an integrated way. Second, we are according top priority to C<sup>3</sup>I, and finally, rather than by a patchwork approach, this program is going to persist towards a goal and do it in a balanced and steady way.

Section E, General Purpose Forces, has three major subsections. The first discusses our employment policies and discusses how we plan to use our general purpose forces. Given force insufficiencies, we can't be everywhere at once, and therefore we have concluded that in a conflict with the Soviet Union, we must undertake sequential operations and establish clear priorities. As a corollary to this, reserves and mobilization are an essential part of our force posture. The section does observe that US forces should be prepared to deal with non-Soviet conflicts, although in non-Soviet conflicts we should rely primarily on indigenous forces. The second major subsection deals with force employment strategy -- how do we plan on using our resources? In peacetime, we plan to take advantage of forward deployed forces, security assistance, special operations, exercises, and the capability of our rapid deployment forces. In wartime, in a conventional war not involving the Soviet Union, we ought to limit the scope of the conflict, keep the Soviets out, and end the conflict as quickly as possible. In a conventional war involving the Soviet Union, we ought to be able to deploy our forces rapidly to deter further aggression, attempt to halt the Soviet advances and prepare to execute counter-offensives where appropriate, with the words "where appropriate" being very important. The paper makes the conclusion that, and I quote, "the US does not now possess a credible capability to achieve all military objectives simultaneously. In the midterm we will remain unable to meet the requirements for simultaneous global operations." The final subsection deals with force development; in other words, what do we want to fix first? The paper opts for first priority to be given to operational improvements: First, readiness, be sure what you have works; second, priority is to upgrade C<sup>3</sup> -- make sure what you have works as a team; then sustainability -- be sure that what you have keeps on working; then mobility -- so that what you have can operate where you want it to operate; and finally, force modernization.

There are three new elements in this section. First, the paper treats with global planning; no longer are we talking about 2½ war strategy or 1½ war strategy. Second, the paper tells our forces to be prepared to respond to non-Soviet contingencies. In Carter documents there was a clear

implication that US forces would not be required to respond to non-Soviet contingencies. Finally, the section sets a clear and comprehensive order of priorities.

Section F, Security Assistance. This section states that security assistance can be the most cost-effective investment we can make, especially right now. The major problem is that though there are more than 150 nations in the world, 60 percent of our security assistance goes to two countries -- Israel and Egypt. If you add Turkey and Greece, 75 percent of our security assistance goes to four countries. Yet there are problems all over the world, and Bill Casey has a map that he will discuss later that points that out so vividly. A second problem is that we are hamstrung by Congress. The section lays out the following proposed solution to our security assistance problems.

Proposed solutions: First, we must establish a full court press under Congress to pass the FY 82 supplemental and the FY 83 bill. Second, we must plan for steady growth, for security assistance as part of the defense pie. Third, we must use more multiyear commitments to our allies and friends. Fourth, we must anticipate foreign military sales by activating and using our Special Defense Acquisition Fund. Fifth, we must undertake a legislative strategy to amend or rewrite as appropriate the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. This section is different from the previous administration's approach to security assistance in that it sets a plan of action, recognizes the vital role of security assistance, and unlike the Carter Administration, it is not queasy about security assistance. During the Carter administration there was an aura of "security assistance is simply cattle prods for cops."

The final section, Section G, deals with Force Integration. The purpose of this section is to tie everything together. Included in the analysis is a discussion of the trade-offs between money, strategy and risk. The paper addresses:

- unified forces -- no one force can win the war;
- balanced forces -- combat as well as support forces and deployed forces and those at home;
- total forces -- active and reserves;
- mobility;
- mobilization;
- integration of the entire spectrum of strategic components so that we win at the lowest possible level;
- worldwide capabilities;
- integration of nuclear and conventional forces;
- strategic defense and space

The paper then looks at resulting risks and concludes that in the near term in conventional forces we are deficient in nearly every area; therefore there is a need for a steady, orderly plan to reduce risk. In strategic nuclear forces, we are in danger of blackmail if we don't fix our shortfalls promptly. In looking at the mid-term and longer term our general purpose forces can maintain forward deployments and can deter and fight local conflicts not involving the Soviet Union. However, our general purpose forces for the mid and longer term will remain inadequate for global conflict against the Soviet Union. Indeed, we will be more balanced and more mobile by the end of the 1980s but relative risk in large measure will depend on what the Soviet Union will do. Finally, the report requires annual risk assessments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This section is in fact wholly different from the previous administration because it does treat with the concept of integration.

The last thing I would like to do is to sum up. We have prepared an interagency study on national strategy. There are three sides to the strategy: money, risk and strategy. We held that the FYDP is the baseline. We developed the strategy and assessed the risk. We could do three things: We could change our strategy, we could change the money allocations, or we could accept the risk and reallocate it where we want it. This is not a novel approach. It has been done for many years.

I will now summarize the entire study. We have recognized the risk and redistributed that risk to places where we want it. We must assure nuclear deterrence with the modernization program that will allow our strategic nuclear forces to regain parity with the Soviet Union. In peacetime we rely principally on non-military means to achieve our objectives. In conflicts not involving the Soviet Union we seek to limit the scope of any conflict, keep the Soviets out, and end it quickly. If confronted by the Soviet Union, we plan on sequential operations with lesser operations in secondary theaters. We plan to undertake counter-offensives only where they can affect the outcome of the war and are key to our primary objectives.

Judge Clark: I propose that we hold the discussion on security assistance until the end, and open the discussion this afternoon on the nuclear, general purpose forces, and force integration sections.

Secretary Haig: I would like to stress the imperative of a land-based nuclear deterrent. It is critically important in our ability to manage crises, and if we hope to establish arms control incentives for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Weinberger: I would like to emphasize the points that Secretary Haig has just made. I agree with him completely. A key is survivable land-based systems. The fact that our MINUTEMAN vulnerability is in the order of 80 to 82 percent must be reversed. We need to have the MX and must have it get off the production line. We must also put it somewhere; anywhere is better than in warehouses. The Townes Commission gave us three ideas and we are now working on a fourth. It is not enough to put the MX in existing holes where they would remain vulnerable.

Judge Clark: I would like to point out that the President is being kept informed on this problem and has a very high interest in it.

Mr. Stockman: I would like to make a generic comment on the entire study. There is no doubt that this study is a step forward and I am not quarreling with it, but I hope it is but a start and not an end. There is an enormous gap between strategy and capability. It is clear that the resources are not satisfactory to execute the strategy. The study does not address the resources implications and I appreciate the fact that the study was not intended to do so. We have identified the issues but now we need to go on to the later steps of figuring out how to resolve the imbalance between strategy and capability.

Secretary Weinberger: The process is in-place but it is an enormous task. The Soviet Union is in the lead because of its enormous investment, the fact that we gave them too much technology, and the fact that they stole much technology. What we have done and what the report confirms is to begin the long hard process of bringing back the security that our nation demands while recognizing that Defense will never get more than 30 percent of the total budget. That means that the problems will not disappear but the process is in-place. We have developed a budget and the weapons systems. Congress has endorsed our plan -- 98 percent of it last year and so far this year, 90 percent. But we must understand the mess we inherited and the huge task that is before us.

Mr. Baker: Are the resources there to do the job?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, by the end of the decade we will have a posture which will allow us to achieve reasonable assurance of deterring Soviet aggression. However, today we cannot make such statements.

Mr. Baker: Will we have shortfalls at the end of the decade?

Secretary Weinberger: The answer of course depends on the risk. A no-risk strategy would require 80 percent of the budget. Of course, Defense getting that size of the budget would leave us with problems at least as bad in other areas as those we have in the Defense sector today.

President: What we are saying is that the plan does not require \$500 billion more. In other words, the plan is in-place.

Secretary Weinberger: Tom Reed did an extremely good job. There are of course quicker ways to reduce the risk but they would be incredibly expensive. The plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has a price tag of \$750 billion, would increase our carrier force from 15 to 23, but that of course would give you additional risk in numerous non-military sectors. By the end of the decade, our plan will allow us to regain the ability to deter. Our problem is the high risk we face today. In sum, the Defense request is modest.

Mr. Meese: What does "sequential operations" mean? Is it similar to the World War II 'historical example'?

Mr. Reed: It is. It means that you focus your forces at the point where your vital interests are threatened and have strategic defensive, lesser operations in other areas.

Secretary Weinberger: Sequential operations means that we will have to accept some early losses.

President: We should consider attacks at places which while not confronting the Soviet Union directly, could hurt them just the same; such as Cuba.

Admiral Hayward: We are doing that kind of planning right now.

Mr. Stockman: In reading the document I note that in page after page we require a capability that will not be provided by the FYDP. The statement is made that when the FYDP force is fielded, we still will not be able to fully carry out our strategy. There are serious implications for reserve forces and sustainability. What are the cost implications? There is an indication that there is a requirement to add force structure. It seems as though we need to add numbers to needs.

Secretary Weinberger: We will be less able to carry out our strategy in Year 2 than we will in Year 6. At the end of the plan we will still not be risk-free. However, it is all a matter of degree. Our task is large. What we can do we will do, but it will not fix everything. Even the Chiefs' \$750 billion plan would take a decade. There is a period of danger and we must rely on our allies and friends.

Admiral Hayward: The five-year plan does not do it all. We couldn't do it all no matter how much money Defense received. We don't have the industrial infrastructure, we don't have the industrial capacity. However, the study requires that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide an annual risk assessment that will enable us to better evaluate how we are reducing risk.

Mr. Casey: We just completed a Soviet strategic capability assessment. It is clear that the Soviets have much capability, but they also have much uncertainty. In this regard, it seems to me that we need to emphasize the cruise missile and strategic defensive systems.

Secretary Weinberger: We should also mention the Soviet Union is having significant problems in Afghanistan.

Judge Clark: Let us now start our discussion on security assistance.



Mr. Casey: The map that I have provided you displays the countries that are being threatened by Soviet actions and the actions of Soviet proxies. Eleven countries located near chokepoints are being threatened. The threatened countries are not capable of defending themselves. However, they do not require sophisticated arms. They need light weapons and communications gear. We must remember that a little gets a lot done when it comes to security assistance.

Secretary Haig: The security assistance problem has two dimensions. The first dimension is our near-term requirement, to gain passage on the FY 82 supplemental and the FY 83 package. The longer-term aspect of the security assistance problem is the requirement to straighten out the confusing set of legislative restrictions and the inability to respond responsively to valid security assistance requirements. The objective of security assistance is frequently misunderstood. It needs to be understood that security assistance is a coherent and essential element of strategy. Security assistance is a political tool, a force multiplier, and a centerpiece of national policy. We have a battle on the Hill. We are asking for \$1.2 billion over FY 82 figures. There are valid reasons for this upswing. The previous administration let the program falter, and we now have an enormous backlog to fill.

A straightline security assistance budget gives us a disaster. The tragedy right now is that most of our security assistance money is consumed by Egypt and Israel. When you add Spain and Turkey, you have the package. It is crucial for the near-term aspect of our problem to gain White House support for the FY 82 supplemental and the FY 83 package. There can be no divergence of views among the leadership of this administration with regard to the requirement for security assistance. Mr. President, we do not have a prayer of securing Congressional approval unless you are involved.

The President: We are suffering from years of bad aid programs. We are now doing it right. I think it can be done.

Mr. Baker: The President was able to secure agreement last year because he vetoed the continuing resolution. That scenario can't be easily repeated this year.

Mr. Duberstein: The Congressional obstacles are severe. The \$1.2 billion increase is on the minds of many of our Republican friends.

Mr. Meese: We have to be careful in how we approach Congress. Methodology is important. We can no longer use old methods. Bill Casey's map accompanied by overlays to show where security assistance money is to go is an example of how we might package it. We must take care in packaging this program the right way.

Mr. Baker: In approaching the security assistance bill on the Hill we should go at it in stages.

Secretary Haig: We only have three weeks.

Mr. Casey: We also have to restructure the whole concept of security assistance. We must make it more responsive and more timely. We cannot respond to today's problems when we require a two-year lead-time to provide equipment needed to combat today's problems.

Secretary Haig: We must also fix the longer term. The Defense profile is up and the security assistance profile should go up in tandem. We have to deal with and solve the legislative prohibitions and make the Special Defense Acquisition Fund work.

Secretary Weinberger: The SDAF is very important and certainly is a step in the right direction. Security assistance can give us added strength at much less cost. There are modest requests from many countries such as Korea, countries in the Caribbean, Tunisia, Portugal, Kenya and Spain. We need to think about redirections in the security assistance program. Of course it will take a major fight, but security assistance helps to buy our security on a cheaper basis.

Judge Clark: The President will get the decision directive together by the middle of next week.

The meeting was adjourned at 3:15 p.m.

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NSC Meeting  
4/27/82  
NSSD 1-82

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4/27/82

BY and, NARA, DATE 11/3/05

VSC Mtg  
1415-  
1513

Pres: thanks to all for hard work on study - one of most meaningful statements of any admin ... basis nat'l strategy for remainder of century ... understand that other studies underway

J.C.: today review last four parts - security assistance has taken on new meaning from our perspective here - Tom Reed direct next part of discussion

T.R.: review what we talked about last time (...) - today discuss four topics - ① strat nuc forces ... we don't enjoy superiority or even parity ... restoring parity of 1st priority to US ... Oct decisions reaffirmed ... get on with it in an effective way - ② GP forces ... employment policies sequential, prioritized, w/ reserves & allies ... in peacetime, 1st put funds on forward deployment, rapid reinforcement, then on sec assis ... discuss wartime objectives - ③ force development: 1st fix readiness, then upgrade C3, then sustainability, then viability, then modernization - how is this different? ... global planning, response to non Soviet contingencies - ④ security assistance (overview points ... Carter Admin "queasy" about SA ... hopefully substitute SA for direct involvement) - ⑤ force integration - then talk about risks (overview ... blackmail strat area ... not adequate for global conflict w/ Soviets) ... require regular risk assessments from JCS - study: money / strategy / risk ... basically stuck to five year plan - what do we really propose ① recognize / distribute risks where we want ② restore nuc parity ③ use nonmil means ④ if conflicts, keep Soviets out ⑤ if war, sequential ⑥

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J.C.: change order slightly — nuclear forces? (silence?)  
GP?

Haig: want to say one word on nuc — growing criticality  
of land-based strategic deterrent

Weinberger: agree fully, which makes it all the more  
imperative whatever we adopt be survivable — get  
MX off production line — terribly complex finding  
survivable system —

J.C.: pres is being informed, as recently as last Thurs  
— GP.

Stockman: generic comment — now?

J.C.: yes

Stockman: important study, but hopes it's  
a start, not a stop — gap between objectives  
& resources — need study what the resource  
implications are, now that the issues are clearly  
identified

Weinberger: I think the process is in place &  
working — inherited & must accept fact that  
at least for rest of decade, Soviet forces  
quan. superior & equal equivalent & take

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5-6 yrs ... important to stay with program  
— are embarked — huge task — all choices ~~involve~~ involve  
risks & delays beyond what we'd like to have

Baker: question ... resources there under FYDP to  
carry out goals in this study?

Weinberger: yes — there are degrees of risk, but  
FYDP by end of decade gives reasonable  
assurance

President: this is what I was wondering — 500 B  
in budget to bring it into being

Weinberger: no — good studying — there are ways  
of reducing risk or doing it quicker, but  
vastly more expensive — 750 B assessment

Pres: leak here?

Weinberger: no — was an assessment by JCS,  
was reasonable, but requires a vast amount  
— hope you all realize how moderate our  
requests have been

Pres: joke re: eating money

Meese: sequential operations? like WWII

Reed/Weinberger : yes

Reagan : have we ever looked at places where we could give them trouble? Cuba?

Hayward : yes - several places 'in here we look at that

Weinberger : yes

J.C. : anything else on this?

Stockman : I thought I read that FYDP can't meet strategy (quotes \$)... are resources to remedy such problems in the 5-yr plan, and if not, what are the resource implications

T.R. : this is not a wish year - didn't include \$

Weinberger : 'in yr 2 some statements were accurate than yr 6 - much more strength as you get toward end of FYDP ... not risk-free & rely on friends, on Soviets not moving w/o overwhelming superiority

Hayward : FYDP doesn't do all this, but it gets us moving in right direction

Casey: recent assessment of capabilities - force them to compete in areas that throw off their planning

Weinberger: (comment)

J.C.: move on - Casey's chart

debriefed  
Bob Lilac  
on this  
section  
here onward),  
1630,  
27 Apr 82  
MW

Casey: (explains map) - for threatened companies to defend themselves, they need security assistance

J.C.: this am Pres ... Sat night special under every pillow

Pres: give them a gun - see how occupying forces like it if everyone had a gun

J.C.: AI

Haig: frequently misunderstanding sec assis. importance, was in Carter Admin - our security - helping like-minded (or even encouraging to be like-minded) - essentially pol. fool - major battle/problem on Hill - increased figures because of Carter vacuum/neglect - essence of our prog. is that large portion absorbed by 4 as pointed out - straight lining would be a political disaster - crucial to have full WH staff support ... all singing from



same music — not a prayer unless you're personally involved

Pres: suffering from long years when foreign aid was a damn Mickey Mouse hole we were pouring money in — now educating is task

Baker: as Al pointed out, hard — only thing last yr was you vetoing continuing resolution

Ken Duberstein: no doubt moving ahead crucial — don't underestimate obstacles

Meese: approach 'important' — brief Congress, use maps

Haig: Ed right — problem w/ our conservative friends is they think our policy is same as old policy

Pres: (joke)

Haig: (repeat)

Baker: go in stages

Haig: only 3 weeks available ~~TOP SECRET~~

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Casey: problem is that beyond this year, need more flexibility — example Tunisia — need quick help

Haig: that is 2nd part of this paper — this is what Bill's talking about (SDAF, etc)

Weinberger: SDAF important — I'm in agreement with what's been said — need to give some thought to redirecting

J.C.: 2 min — questions

President: no

J.C.: over week Pres review papers — decision directive hopefully by midweek next week