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NSC
START
5/21/82

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NLS M03-1308#1

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 11/4/05

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NSC Meeting
START
5/21/82
0943

Bud McF: revised earlier decision — here today to cover 5 remaining agenda items — Outline restraints (substantive & public affairs context) — to ratify SALT II would legitimize buildup, legitimize gross inequalities, delay getting on w/ reductions — revised pros & cons — any comments? [no]

Pres: what's good, if anything, in SALT II?

Bud: counting rules

Haig: preclude breakdown they could do — we're not abiding by SALT II per se — political element

Meese: strategic planning not constrained

Weinberger: demopack ALCM — I don't think the Soviets could do more than they've done now — if we say we'll abide by SALT II, I don't think we'll get on with START

Meese: I was assuming that what the Pres. said earlier — we'll not be constrained in planning

Rostow: for the moment, it's in our interest to abide — no advantage to change policy — SFRC

Weinberger: I'm not advocating public announcement — clear internally — we need to be

Meese: but when we advance basing moved for MX, we must be prepared

Haig: problem at moment is a political problem — getting on w/ START will resolve issue — if we raise issue now, it will complicate MX

Weinberger: ensure our budget planning

Simon: answer question @ DELTA III testing — have to take out YANKEES — 168? ② at least 2 new ICBMs underway, can only test 1

(2)

③ BACKARE production less than it could be ④ SS-18 MIRVs

⑤ future verification — encryption of telemetry

Reagan: are they going ahead w/ new sub programs
Ingram:

Muse: I think we're agreed ① no Δ in public formulation

② resist any attempt to revive SALT II ③ as a matter of policy, no constraints... when

Postow: don't ~~to~~ violate until deploy...

McFarlane: we have words that capture this — IG — get back by you

Rowny: whatever we say, distance ourselves from SALT II
— help negotiator

McFarlane: 2nd issue

Weinberger: would hope paper not intended for dissemination — "some believe..."

Murphy: does this paper assume we're satisfied w/ telemetry we're getting now

McFarlane: isn't intended to — next issue mobiles
— propose we reserve judgment in our position, although Rowny wishes to build in from start

Rowny: everyone's agreed we want to keep open options
be it — issue is true mobile — if we don't want, time to decide is now

McFarlane: you have paper to consider — move on
— do we want to ban heavies first, etc. — number of ~~issues~~ ^{issues} — to IG, w/ your approval, for report within two weeks

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Weinberger: I thought original paper did include
banning of heavies

Pres: MXs?

Weinberger: less than heavy

Pres: Titans - trading chip?

Idle: Soviets don't worry about Titans

Pres: heavier than MX?

(chorus): 18s

Pres: 18 heavier than 19?

(chorus): yes

Postow: comment

Pres: if we go for heavies let, don't we have
negotiation problems

Idle: it's like SS-20 / zero-option

Hayward: get at 18s indirectly

McFarlane: final issue - phasing - single or
two agreements

Weinberger: Phase II as important as Phase I

I worried procedurally - would argue
for single treaty, one process, because
of strong importance we attach to it as
only way to achieve equality at lower levels
- if treaty w/ Phase II, don't get them back

Haig: thought this was issue you decided
last time, Mr. Pres - if we can get
objectives in I, ~~we~~ sign treaty
- I read decision memo that way
& briefed on Hill, allies briefed that way -

(4)

- easy matter - have, for instance, 5 year review tied to good faith on Phase I - must keep credibility

Weinberger: no one ~~intends~~ intends to undercut credibility

Haig: must be clear or clear

Weinberger: I'm worried - Signs ALCMS ...

Haig: if I achieve everything in Phase I, then I don't sign, and be laughed out of court

Hayward: if you get Phase I, substantial cut JW

Rosiny: announcement of whether or not we seek agreement in Phase I should be kept open, from negotiating point of view (discuss Soviet tactics)

Pres: when we talked about it, I didn't think we meant 2 separate treaties - when we achieve 1st, then see what's needed in phase II, where we stand (asks question) - am I being Boy Scout

Haig: you said it better than anybody

McFarlane: will you sign

Weese: can't you reserve question until then

Haig: it's already been asked: Congress, allies - don't want to reverse decision already made, via this esoteric discussion

Weinberger: don't bind us because we've briefed w/o clarification of decision

(5)

Rostow: explain as in INF, depends on how Soviets play it — don't create impression we're out to get one treaty quickly

Haig: great danger is that it looks like you waffling on what you said: Phase I warheads — if bureaucracy's confused, will emerge

Pres: couldn't part of negotiations be this

Haig: yes — ~~call~~ call it interim, or whatever

Meese: Phase I — reserve decision

McFarlane: precedent — conclude,

Bush: do we then go to Senate, ask ratify I?

Dele: do like test bans

Weinberger: procedural matter — don't tie hands
Oby saying that once Phase I done, go to Senate

Pres: until completed on Phase I, don't know what tw problem is in Phase II

Haig: want to be careful of what has been bureaucratic hassle — don't undercut Phase I unit of measure

Pres: continuing negotiation

Rostow: don't fix on 2 agreements

Meese: think we're agreed

McFarlane: yes

Baker: on fast, prepare written guidance

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Pres: consensus items
McFarlane:

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: MIKE WHEELER *MW*

SUBJECT: Attendance List for National Security Council Meeting of Friday, May 21 1982, 9:30 - 10:30 in the Cabinet Room

The following officials plan to attend the NSC meeting on START which is scheduled for Friday, May 21, 1982, at 9:30 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. *(C)*

The Vice President

White House

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Mr. Jonathan Howe

Mr. Edwin Meese III

Mr. James A. Baker III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Richard G. Darlan

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Admiral John M. Poindexter

RADM
OSD

Secretary Casper W. Weinberger

FRED IKLE

OMB

Mr. William Schneider

NSC

Colonel Michael O. Wheeler

Mr. Sven Kraemer

Colonel Robert Linhard

CIA

Admiral B. R. Inman

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpartick

JCS

Acting Chairman Admiral Thomas Hayward

Lt Gen Paul F. Gorman

ACDA

Mr. Eugene V. Rostow

Mr. Robert Grey

General Edward Rowney

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CJS* NARA, Date *3/05/01*

Approved

[Signature] As Amended *[Signature]*

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Review May 20, 1984

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