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JIC(82) 28th Meeting

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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Room 215, Cabinet Office on
MONDAY 24 MAY 1982 at 3.30 pm

PRESENT

Mr P R H Wright
Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (In the Chair)

Mr R P Flower
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Vice-Admiral Sir Roy Halliday
Ministry of Defence

Mr J L Jones
Security Service

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Sir Antony Duff
Cabinet Office

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Air Vice-Marshal M J Armitage
Ministry of Defence

Mr A W Saunders
Government Communications Headquarters

Mr R J O'Neill
Assessments Staff

Mr P G Wallis
Assessments Staff

Brigadier A B D Gurdon
Assessments Staff

Mrs J P Hamilton-Eddy
Assessments Staff
(Items 1 and 2)

Captain J J R Tod
Assessments Staff
(Item 1)

SECRETARIAT

Mr T W Savage
Commander A H R York
Mr F J Wilson (Items 1-5)
Mr P J Bulstrode

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1. FALKLAND ISLANDS: CURRENT ASSESSMENTS

The Committee had before them JIC(82)(IA) 83, 84, 87, 88 and 90, Daily Assessments on the Falkland Islands issued since their previous meeting and JIC(82)(IA)86, an Immediate Assessment on "Likely Reactions of Rio Treaty States to the British Landings in the Falkland Islands".

During discussion it was noted that although individual Latin American countries might consider withdrawing their Ambassadors from London in protest against the British landings on the Falkland Islands, co-ordinated diplomatic action (such as breaking off relations) was unlikely. It was more likely that there would be an attempt by Argentina and her supporters to persuade Rio Treaty States to take a joint decision on whatever action could be agreed as a demonstration of Latin American solidarity. It had been suggested by the Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence that internal Argentine reactions to the British landings would need to be kept under close review because they were likely to alter significantly as the Argentine public became more aware of the real situation, from which until now they had been shielded. Reactions within the Junta itself would also be affected by this inevitably increasing public knowledge and by their own appreciation of British determination.

Continuing assessment of Argentine efforts to obtain arms supplies from other countries was also crucial. The Ministry of Defence were co-ordinating work on this topic.

The Committee -

1. Took note of JIC(82)(IA)s 83, 84, 86, 87, 88 and 90.
2. Invited the Chief of the Assessments Staff to proceed in accordance with their discussion.

2. NATO ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: MC 161/82 and MC 255/82: REPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE NATO INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP

The Committee resumed their discussion of JIC(82)(SEC) 20 dated 13 May 1982, a Secretary's Minute covering a Report by the United Kingdom Delegation to the NATO Intelligence Working Group on the draft NATO documents MC 161/82 (Warsaw Pact Strength and Capabilities) and MC 255/82 (The Significance to NATO of Soviet Policy and Activities in the Middle East and Peripheral Areas).

During the discussion it was noted with regard to MC 161 that in Part I, Section 1, Paragraph 21 the Soviet Union had been described as being "instrumental" in the imposition of martial law in Poland. The judgment was considered to be inconsistent with that contained in JIC(82)(N) 24 dated 6 April 1982 which had assessed that the USSR had applied continuous and unremitting pressure on the Polish leadership to take action to preserve the Communist system in Poland. It was however noted that the wording in Paragraph 21 had been accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation as part of the overall process of compromise in the drafting of the document which had, in the main, reflected the United Kingdom point of view.

On the other hand it was clear that the Assessments Staff and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had some serious reservations concerning judgments contained in MC 255/82 which were inconsistent with JIC Assessments. The NATO paper was considered to be more hawkish, concentrating more on the opportunities for exploitation by the Soviets than on the problems and burdens which the Third World presented to the Soviet Union. However, given that the main purpose of the document was to identify implications for NATO, particularly for Southern Flank countries such as Turkey and Greece, the faults in analysis were not considered to be of major significance. It was noted, therefore, that although members would not wish to recommend formal non-acceptance of the report and documents it would be helpful if their reservations could be reported to the Chiefs of Staff for passing on to the United Kingdom MILREP as background information for the future and for use as appropriate in the Military Committee's final discussions on MC 161/82 and 255/82.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would wish to take note of the Report of the United Kingdom Delegation to the NATO Intelligence Working Group on the NATO Annual Intelligence Estimates MC 161/82 and MC 255/82. However, in recommending that the documents be approved by the Chiefs of Staff, they would wish to agree that their reservations on some of the judgments, particularly in MC 255, should be drawn to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff and passed on to the United Kingdom MILREP for use by him when the documents were finally considered by the NATO Military Committee. When the subject was considered next year, there would be advantage in the United Kingdom Delegation ensuring that their final Report could, in addition to commenting on the changes from the previous year, include specific reference to the areas of the drafts which had proved contentious and required significant compromise in the final wording.

The Committee -

1. Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up of their discussion.
2. Instructed the Secretary, in consultation with the Chief of the Assessments Staff, to inform the Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the Chairman's summing up.

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3. FALKLAND ISLANDS INQUIRY

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4. FUTURE MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

THE CHAIRMAN said that in view of the continuing Falkland Islands crisis the Committee would wish to review the arrangements outlined in JIC(82)(SEC) 15 of 28 April for their meetings during the forthcoming Queen's Birthday and Spring Bank Holiday period.

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Following a brief discussion the Committee agreed they should meet as follows -

a. THURSDAY 27 MAY at 11.00 am

This meeting, restricted to UK Eyes, would review the Falkland Islands situation and consider JIC(82)(N) 51 (Draft) on Iran, Iraq and the Gulf.

b. TUESDAY 1 JUNE at 3.30 pm

Restricted to UK Eyes, this meeting would review the Falkland Islands and also consider JIC(82)(RP) 7, the United Kingdom's Intelligence Priorities, 1982-1984.

c. THURSDAY 3 JUNE at 2.30 pm

This would be the normal weekly meeting, with Allies present, as already arranged.

CIGS would meet as outlined in JIC(82)(SEC) 15 and, in addition, the CIG on the Falkland Islands would continue to meet on a daily basis throughout the holiday weekend.

The Committee -

1. Took note.

2. Instructed the Secretary to proceed with arrangements for meetings in accordance with their discussion.

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5. DISCLOSURE OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRESS

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25 May 1982

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