

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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NSC Meeting

November 18, 1982
2:00 p.m.
Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: M-X Basing Decision (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

State
Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe

JCS
General George W. Vessey, Jr.
Lt General Paul F. Gorman

OSD
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci

OSTP
Dr. George A. Keyworth

CIA
Mr. William J. Casey
[REDACTED]

White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Richard G. Darman
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Mr. Fred Fielding
Ms. Pam Turner

OMB
Dr. Alton Keel

ACDA
Mr. Robert T. Grey

NSC
Mr. Thomas C. Reed
Col Horace L. Russell
Col Michael O. Wheeler

Minutes

Judge Clark began the meeting by stating the purpose was to discuss the M-X permanent basing mode and the possible deployment areas. He then introduced Thomas C. Reed, Special Assistant to the President, and noted that after Reed's overview Secretary Weinberger would provide some comments.

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Declassify on: OADR

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
E.O. 12958
135216

Mr. Reed opened with the comment that the problem to be solved was should the M-X be deployed and if so, how? He noted that we are retiring 1 Titan missile every 45 days and the Minuteman force will also start to wear out. He also noted that by 1986 only 5% of the Minuteman force would survive a Soviet ICBM attack. Reed then reviewed the expected kill probability of MMIII versus M-X and raised the question, should we continue the TRIAD or go to sea? He noted the cost of options ranged from no cost up to \$36B. He then expressed his understanding that closely spaced basing (CSB) would probably be supportable by Congress, but silo stuffing would not. He then ticked off the following options:

- Abandon the land-based leg of the TRIAD - no cost.
- Deploy 100 M-X in existing MM silos - \$17B.
- 100 M-X in CSB - \$26.4B.
 - Add deception to CSB with 200 additional silos (would soak up entire SS-18 force). +\$5.8B
 - Add Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) with a small area to defend and treaty compliant. +\$8B
 - Do BMD R&D and Long Lead Procurement. +\$3.5B
- Proceed back to M-X/Multiple Protective Shelters. -\$40B to \$45B

He then indicated the Secretary of Defense had provided a list of suitable basing locations if CSB was selected and that an environmental summary had been provided to the participants. Reed also indicated that any location would be legally defensible if challenged on environmental grounds.

Secretary Weinberger began by saying M-X basing was a most difficult decision given Soviet technology. He then noted that MPS was not suitable because the Soviets would require no new technology to defeat it. Weinberger noted at an expected cost of \$40B for MPS, the President was correct by deciding not to proceed with MPS. He then said the question is do we give up the TRIAD or do we keep ICBMS? Weinberger then stated that we have to keep the TRIAD because he does not feel the other two legs are so invulnerable that we can afford not to. Weinberger indicated that the Soviets must not lose the perception that our systems can survive a first strike. He noted that the situation was okay now, but our deterrence is weakening. He further noted that what is left is for the President to conclude in 15 minutes that we are under nuclear attack and then launch - very destabilizing. Weinberger then indicated that we must look at the future. He noted that in 1989 the submarines will have survivability and the B-1s can penetrate through the 1990s. He pointed out

that Senator John Tower says silo stuffing will not be supported; we would not get support for only keeping MINUTEMAN; Congress doesn't like the idea of an airplane; deep underground basing can't be ready until the late nineties; and south sides of mesas are in the future. Weinberger then said, "I have no hesitancy to recommend CSB."

He then noted that fratricide would not allow a simultaneous attack because the incoming warheads would destroy each other and that close spacing and superhardness would stress the Soviet system. Weinberger indicated an M-X flyout window of about two hours should restore a substantial amount of deterrence at a baseline cost of \$26B. He then turned to the defended system employing SPARTAN and SPRINT as a possible addition after we see how the Soviets respond. He next talked about deceptive options--adding additional silos. He noted that two or three states are displaying interest in being selected. He then noted that Dr. Townes recommended against M-X/MPS because the Soviets could develop a counter within three years after deployment.

Weinberger then noted that Townes did have some doubt on the amount of silo hardness obtainable, but on balance he (Weinberger) still recommends CSB and keeping the 1986 initial operational capability.

General Vessey opened with the comment that he would perhaps repeat some of the previous arguments, but would indicate areas of JCS agreement and disagreement. He then made the points that security is dependent on both arms control and military strength; stability comes from deterrence, and deterrence comes from warfighting ability; strategic nuclear forces alone will not buy deterrence; JCS supported START with the understanding that M-X would be deployed; all JCS Chiefs support fielding the M-X, but do not agree on basing mode.

Vessey outlined the position of the Service Chiefs as follows: Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations worry about M-X survivability and command-and-control problems as well as the fact that fixed based systems cannot be made invulnerable. The two Chiefs recommend we base some M-X in MINUTEMAN silos but eventually move to the sea-based system, D-5. If the decision is made to go with M-X in CSB, then a BMD system should be included at the outset. The Air Force Chief of Staff recommends M-X in CSB. The Commandant of the Marine Corps worries about the uncertainty of M-X survival with or without BMD.

General Vessey then noted that NSDD-13 plans certain attacks-- nuclear forces, command-and-control, industrial facilities, and the industrial base.


He then stated that we provide much softer targets

Vessey then recommended that M-X be added and the D-5

be fielded to complicate the Soviet attack. He further stated that CSB does add survivability, and recommended the M-X in CSB and R&D for BMD.

Secretary Shultz opened with the point that this M-X missile is an essential part of what we need if Geneva is to succeed. He then said, "I will support M-X/CSB." He added that if we don't maintain our strength--the Soviets' stock-in-trade--we will have problems as we urge our allies with respect to the INF. Shultz then indicated that he would not comment on technical difficulty.

Deputy Director Grey made the point that deployment in MM silos would be destabilizing, but M-X/CSB does not undercut START or existing agreements.



Director Casey opened with the possible Soviet threats to dense pack and deceptive basing and referred to the NSC issue paper which treated the threat in more detail. He identified the 25 megaton weapon and soft landers as a potential threat if the Soviets expended considerable effort. He presented the timing of such a threat as uncertain, but added it could come as soon as the early 1990s.

He also indicated that the Soviets will have to do missile defense or deception, therefore, requiring an enormous increase by the Soviets. Casey also indicated that the Soviets might abrogate the ABM Treaty.

Mr. Keyworth opened with the statement that we need the Triad and need the CSB effectiveness which would make it most expensive for the Soviets. He then said the M-X/CSB should work very well and he thinks we should proceed.

Deputy Director Grey then recommended that BMD should be included as a growth option.

Mr. Meese asked whether we could save billions if M-X is not placed in capsules and whether or not using capsules is a SALT requirement.

Mr. Reed responded that only a billion could be saved; however, the capsules are needed for the hardness, and SALT adherence is not a factor. He then indicated that a nod toward deception could help pick up M-X/CSB supporters.

Mr. Reed then outlined environmental considerations as follows:

-- Virtually certain that we will be sued on environmental grounds, regardless of M-X basing mode or site.

- Justice position, concurred in by all concerned counsel, is that Presidential (as opposed to agency) decisions are not subject to the requirements of National Environmental Policy Act.
- Nevertheless, to strengthen our legal position and minimize adverse publicity, we should pay careful attention to environmental considerations. Thus, Defense has prepared a Legislative Environmental Impact Statement, a summary of which is in our materials, and will prepare full administrative EIS after final decision.
- While environmental concerns (particularly concerning land withdrawal from the public) increase at the various sites as you go from (1) silo stuffing to (2) CSB/100 silos to (3) CSB/300 silos, the basic conclusion from the various environmental studies is that any combination of basing mode and site is environmentally defensible.
- However, there may be operational difficulties at the various sites in seeking deception via an increase in silos. Cap is prepared to discuss this point.

Mr. Baker made the point that we should not underestimate the difficulty on the Hill.

Secretary Weinberger indicated that the call was the President's on basing mode and area selection, if required.

General Vessey then told the President that his decision would be supported by the JCS, but the Chiefs would give personal views if asked.

The President expressed the need for the Triad, the need for the M-X missile, and his strong belief in deterrence as the correct policy. He then thanked the participants for their views.

The meeting adjourned at 2:58 p.m.

Postscript. On November 22, the President stated his decision to deploy 100 M-X missiles in an array of 100 closely spaced, superhardened silos at or near Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. He directed that the initial operational capability be achieved in 1986 with full operational capability by 1989. He also directed that the deployment be designed with the growth possibility of deceptive measures in mind, and with the recognition that in the future we may have to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense System.

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System 11
90965

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 21, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE / THOMAS C. REED *TR*

FROM: HORACE L. RUSSELL *HAR*

SUBJECT: M-X Basing Decision (U)

Attached for your approval are the minutes for the November 18 NSC Meeting.

Recommendation

That you approve the minutes at Tab I.

Approve *PC/4/10/* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Minutes, November 18, 1982 NSC

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CL* NARA, Date *1/18/05*

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFICATION MARK
DATE 11/18/05 BY [unclear]

NISC Meeting

11/18/82

dux

Please stamp
"Secret" and
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meeting folder.

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/18/05

NSC
11/18/82
2:03pm

22 present

- WPC: opening remarks
- Tom Reed: review problems we're trying to solve - ① maintaining the ICBM force ② survivability ③ hard target kill imbalance ④ what will Congress support ... several items you've decided maintain TRIAD ... go w/ MX ... & 10C — how much to spend? (which option) — how survivable? — relation to arms control? — what will Congress support ... Sen Tower thinks CSB will pass, silos likely not to — overview specific alternatives — siting menu ... regardless of choice, we'll probably be sued
- Sec Weinberger: we've given Soviets the technology to have accuracy driving vulnerability — MPS expensive but vulnerable; hence we didn't pursue — Congress said no to our alternatives ... wanted choice by Dec. 1 — great bulk of people at White House want to keep Triad — we can deter now but deterrence is weakening — what are options? ... Congress has constrained us considerably — we're down to two options, I recommend close-spaced basing → go to chart briefing (Weinberger briefs, Carlucci flips) ... 1/2 hr to get it out ... can be done by '86 ... #26B baseline program ... suboptions provide add'l survivability → chosen after we see what Soviets are doing to meet it ... deception options, which also bear on site selection — two cautions: ① Townes has reported bases on ~~which~~ ^{which} it can be attacked in Soviets could defeat w/ 3 yrs with massive effort; no BMD ② superhardening involves technical risk — very difficult to explain to public
- Pres: [comic relief]
- Gen Vessey: senior mil leadership feel mil strength & arms control policy important — all forces contribute to deterrence, but strat forces not enough — JCS supported START w/ understanding that all legs of Triad be strengthening — all feel (minus CSAF) sped into premature decision — CSA & CNO concerned w/ tech., feel ...

-CSA feels of BMD if in CSB - CSAF CSB - CMC feel Congt
spillover to threaten other parts of buildup - [CJCS personal] my
views ... don't believe they want nuclear war but have built
capability to achieve if war goes nuclear - last yr.
you gave us priorities for targeting in NSDD 37 -



E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(g)

- I believe you
must add MX as soon as possible - decision to
field in silos was sound - recommend, given Congt
opposition, that CSB, R&D on BMD

- Sec Weinberger: [brief comments on impact on ^{START} negotiations, European reaction]
- Sec Shultz: Cap has just made my speech ... I absolutely agree, support CSB - impression I brought away from mtg w/ Andropov was that we must preserve strength if we want ~~them~~ them to take us seriously
- Bob Gray: we think CSB doesn't undercut agreements - is verifiable - MX shelters not fixed launchers - Soviets will complain publicly, but also will negotiate - in mm silos, pushes us toward LVA and is destabilizing which isn't consistent w/ START



E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(g)

Casey: CSB greatly complicate Soviet problem & make it more uncertain - Soviets working on soft-landing RVs which are the most dangerous threat - to have confidence beyond earlier and need BMD to do that

(3)

soft-landing option - BMD options we could exercise ~~will~~ could intensify likelihood of Soviets' abrogating ABM Treaty

- Keyworth: need Triad, and more today than ever before - CSB works & has best exchange ratio, w/ known technology
- Gray: describe BMD as one of several options considering in future
- Neese: two Qs ① BMD R&D violates treaty? (no)
② how much less w/o capsule? (TR: \$1B less out of \$2.6B)
- Tom Reed: sitting & deception comments invited
- Sec Weinberger: deception gives Cong'l support, but not on its own merits
- Jim Baker: Cong'l problem enormous
- Vessey: all Chiefs will support in whatever decision, but will when asked give personal opinion
- Pres: convinced need MX & Triad... will make and announce decision on that basis

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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CAS 12/22/2004

File Folder NSC 00066 18 NOVEMBER 1982 [MX MISSILE BASING
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18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1235	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN MINUTES OF MEETING PAR 12/21/2005 M05-016 #19171	3	11/18/1982	B1
1236	MINUTES	OF 11/18/82 NSC MEETING PAR 12/21/2005 M05-016 #19171A; PAR 10/9/2012 M08-232 #1236	5	11/18/1982	B1 B3
1237	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO RR RE NSC MEETING R 5/7/2013 M402/1	2	ND	B1
1238	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC MEETING R 5/7/2013 M402/1	1	ND	B1
1239	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE MX R 5/7/2013 M402/1	2	ND	B1
1240	CHART	RE MX COSTS (TAB A ATTACHMENT TO TIEM 1239) R 5/7/2013 M402/1	1	ND	B1
1241	PAPER	RE MX (SAME TEXT AS ITEM 1227)	15	ND	B1
1242	PAPER	RE MX FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS (DUPE OF 1228)	8	ND	B1
1243	LIST	OF ATTENDEES R 6/6/2006	1	11/18/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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