

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



Jan 14, 1983

TO: BUD MCFARLANE

Attached is a rough draft of minutes for the NSPG meeting yesterday afternoon. I have used the "literal" approach, although I could reduce it to a summary memcon if you prefer.

It is entirely possible that I missed some points or nuances, or that I accidentally misinterpreted some statements. Therefore, it is important that a second set of eyes -- yours -- scrub this carefully before going final.

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NSPG Meeting, 13 Jan 1983

After introductory remarks by the President and Judge Clark,
the meeting proceeded as follows:

Shultz: The JCS say that the zero option is best but equality^{ity}
levels between 0 and 572 are acceptable. Zero is our
objective. If we cannot get zero we must deploy U.S.
missiles; otherwise it would be catastrophic. We should never
abandon 0/0; it is the best conclusion and it has great
appeal. Therefore if we make a change, we should describe it
as being on the way to 0/0. If we wind up deploying, we
should say that, despite sunk costs, we are always ready for
0/0. If we give up on 0/0 as our ultimate objective, the
peace movement would take it up so fast that your head would
swim.

The next principle after 0/0 is equality. We could
develop a position for Geneva as follows:

We could say to the Soviets that here is what we
think equality means. If you (the Soviets) are interested in
equality but not 0/0, what are you interested in?

The State paper said 300/300, but what I have just
said is what I think is the right way to do it.

Depending on the outcome of this meeting we would have to
come back on details such as timing, the March 6 elections,
the "walk in the woods" approach, and so forth.

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Weinberger: Zero/zero is the best for us, the Allies, and the world. We should not lightly abandon it. Some are pressuring us for movement away from 0/0. However, to start, we should not do anything to interfere with the chances of the Kohl election in Germany. Vogel and Bahr say we must make movement and take the British and French systems into account. If we tell the Soviets we want 0/0 but we are interested in their view of equality, we would signal some abandonment of 0/0. If we abandon 0/0 now, the peace movement would insist that we go back to it. At the moment, we are in a strong position. I agree with George (Shultz) that if there is no agreement, after deployment we should say that we are ready to bear the costs of going back to 0/0. However I am worried about going to the Soviets now without 0/0 and inviting a proposal on the basis of equality; it would infer abandonment of 0/0.

We are in the best position now. We should not show flexibility. The Soviets now have far more SS-20s than when the talks started. They did not freeze. Proposals to move East of the Urals are not serious proposals. For the Vice President's talk in Europe, I think he should not make a proposal, but emphasize how the Soviets are interested in a way of keeping superiority.

The President: The last figure I heard for Soviet SS-20s was 315. Is that still the correct figure?

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Weinberger: They now have 333 SS-20s and are finishing nine more sites. They will have 342 by March or April. Moreover, those missiles are mobile and can hit any targets in Europe.

General Barrow: The JCS very strongly recommend that we stick with 0/0 at this time. We have some misgivings about defining equality, where the Soviets are bringing up British and French systems, aircraft, and other such items. Zero/zero is attractive, simple, and understandable. The German defense minister visited recently; he asked that there be no changes in our position, at least until after the election. Once we move off the 0/0 we will have lost it forever. We should hold fast to 0/0. We should reinvigorate our advocacy of 0/0. In the Vice President's talk, he could emphasize that the SS-20 build-up goes on unabated, but that we are still at zero. Deployment is the only way to bring leverage on the Soviets.

Casey: We should stick with 0/0. If it is important to show flexibility, the deployments must go ahead but we can say that we are open to negotiations beyond that point.

Meese: We should continue with 0/0 as our ultimate objective. The Shultz way is the way to do it. The Vice President can restate it in terms of the correct context. He can say that this is the only way for a pro-arms elimination program.

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Weinberger: The Soviets have a great fear of the Pershing (PII). It is the only leverage we have on them. It takes only 7 or 8 minutes, and is mobile. The Soviets will do almost anything to get rid of it. Therefore we should push 0/0.

The President: Our 572 number -- is this a mix? How many of them are Pershings?

(Several people answered 108.)

Then how did we arrive at that figure?

Weinberger: It was a 1979 decision.

The President: Well, if we have a total of 572 missiles and 108 are Pershings then that means 464 are cruise missiles. We must remain at 0/0. But based on warheads, we had allowed ourselves to be inferior (referring to the 572 decision). Is that a deterrent force only?

Lt Gen Gorman: The 572 number came right out of the air.

The President: We must deploy missiles. We will go along with what is needed for the (FRG) elections, for a starting point. But if we sit there with 0/0 in our negotiating position, and they then propose some ridiculous scheme, we have to respond. Why not go along with an interim reduction of the forces while continuing the negotiations for 0/0? We

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can say we will start with a lower deployment of missiles and make it enough so they will still face Pershings targeted at Russia.

(There was then some extemporaneous discussions about warhead numbers and counts.)

Weinberger: The key phrase is "interim leading to 0/0." Equality is a critical factor. For an interim approach, we would have to make it clear that we plan to continue deployment of Pershing and continue negotiations for 0/0. This could only be an interim approach, and not until considerably later. As soon as we move away from 0/0 it is gone forever.

The President: This can only be an interim move. Would there be any advantage to giving up cruise missiles and keeping the Pershings, since the Pershings are what they are afraid of?

Weinberger: The Pershing is scheduled for Germany; the cruise missile for other countries. Germany originally stated that it required one other continental country to deploy simultaneously. Later Schmidt said two other continental countries. Kohl is being accused of abandoning the "2" criterion. If we abandon cruise missiles, the delicate agreements on deployments with others would be called into question.

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The President: We could take an approach that we need a deterrent force and equality, but that this is an interim step only.

We could beat the drums for more public support. They can't divide the allies from us. We could lose support because we look too inflexible. We could say this is an interim step; reduce our missiles, equality, continued reductions for 0/0.

Casey: The Soviets do not want to see Pershings deployed. They will never agree to a deal which permits Pershings. They have been building a 20 minute launch-on-warning capability, but the Pershing only provides 8 minutes. As soon as we talk about reduced numbers, they will say let's have a further moratorium while we talk. Europe will squabble on where the missiles should go and this will give the Europeans their opportunity to put off the decision. Germany supports 0/0. We cannot allow Moscow a monopoly. There will be no Soviet flexibility until our deployments are assured. At that point (deployment) we can offer further flexibility.

Barrow: Those are valid points.

The President: The point I was making is that we would not do that until past that date. The only way there would be no deployment is if we achieve 0/0. We should deploy on schedule.

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Casey: That will put pressure on the Soviets.

Weinberger: And that will relieve pressure on us from the Soviet proposal.

Shultz: We can ask the Soviets how much they will reduce. This proposal puts equality at the heart of the matter. They had mentioned British and French systems and our approach will put them on the spot.

Vogel may wind up as the guy who bought the used car from Andropov.

Casey: The CDU is using this to put the bee on the SPD and Vogel.

The President Well, I think we are all agreed that we want equality, 0/0, and at some point, talk about reduced numbers as an interim step. The date to start is when we start to deploy.

Shultz: But we don't have complete control over the deployment. It depends to a degree on the imagery in Europe. There needs to be a sense in Europe that we are trying to reach a real result in Geneva. This is why equality is important. We can put it forward as a principle. No numbers are needed on the table. So when their proposal was in, we have put up a standard by which to judge it.

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The President: The Soviets say the British and French systems have got to be considered. But France is not in the NATO military arrangement.

Weinberger: And the negotiations are on intermediate weapons but the British and French weapons are strategic weapons.

The President: If they want to talk about other systems such as aircraft and submarines and the like, we can say that everything is negotiable but we are talking first about the most destabilizing weapons.

Clark: I think it would be useful to raise two points. First, with respect to the partial reorganization of ACDA. It was related to management, not policy or philosophy. Nitze and Rowny were consulted before the decision. George (Shultz) is on top of the management question at ACDA, which reports through State.

Second, we intend to remain on high moral ground. In November Bud McFarlane started on an interim basis a public diplomacy activity. A specific plan has been presented to the President and there will be a decision in the morning. Bud (McFarlane), would you please discuss this.

McFarlane: Mr. President, this dates from your speech in London where you talked about spreading democracy. We had been losing the battle of ideas. We want to foster the proper

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activities in the labor groups, churches, and so forth. Secretary Shultz, Mr. Casey, Mr. Shakesphere and others have discussed the management machinery, and what amount of resources should be devoted and when.

An international political committee will be established, chaired by State. It will be an idea factory. It will develop ideas which would better promote our policy overseas. We have already had two activities: the Committee on Free Elections and the American Policy Foundation's "Project Democracy."

Through Ed Meese's help, we have gotten \$64 million in the FY84 budget and \$20 million in 83 through reprogramming or a supplemental.

With respect to INF in Europe, we are losing to the Soviet propaganda effort. Ambassador Dailey is being designated to immediately promote our efforts in Europe -- to turn the tide on the peace movement and to support INF deployment.

The President: I have gotten so interested in the negotiating position that perhaps I should trade jobs with Nitze. If there are holes in this, let me know. Because of Soviet fear of Pershing and our advocacy of zero, perhaps they could be persuaded to go for a lower figure on an interim basis, while we continue to go for zero over the longer run. We should not be unilateral on this. We should take the countries into our

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confidence. Italy seems like a sure bet, and I think Maggie would go along.

Barrow: We would need a vigorous analysis on the lesser included points and the timing. Even thinking about other than 0/0 is harmful. If we ever talk about it with others, Allies will fall off.

The President: Once we start deploying, the Soviets will understand.

Weinberger: Currently we are saying we want to eliminate an entire category of weapons. The Soviets are not being responsive. We could ask the Soviets if they have another way to eliminate an entire category of weapons.

Kirkpatrick (to Casey): Did you say that the CDU says that no monopoly of Soviet missiles is acceptable?

Casey (Read statement which basically answered the question as "Yes.")

Casey: The Soviets simply are not going to accept 0/0. The best thing we can do is get reductions.

Shultz: Well, that leads to two points. First, their preoccupation with Pershing gives us a good bargaining posture

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because Pershings would be included in any deployment. Second, don't we need to define equality and put this forward to Europe?

The President: In the proposal, the Soviet's plan, if there are 1046 warheads on SS20s, could we say that the Soviets can destroy every town in Europe of a particular size? We could tell that to the placard carriers.

McFarlane: Mr. Wick has a portrayal of that which he wanted to put in your speech. Every time the numbers of missiles goes up a new light goes on showing, for example, London blowing up. But that was a little too strong for your speech.

Clark: We have some very good people ^{at State:} ^{interesting} Larry Eagleburger will be chairing this international committee. We have a short time to explicate the various points.

The President: OK. We will deploy. We will start with zero.

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