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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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September 7, 1984

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National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
Friday, August 31, 1984, 11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Pakistan and NSDD-99 Work Program (TS)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

White House:
Mr. Edwin P. Meese, III
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
Ambassador Richard W. Murphy

OMB:
Dr. Alton Keel

Treasury:
Secretary Donald T. Regan

NSC:
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
CAPT Philip A. Dur

OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Mr. Richard L. Armitage

ACDA:
Director Kenneth Adelman

CIA:
Director William J. Casey
Mr. Robert S. Gates

JCS:
General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane: Mr. President, the first item on the agenda for this meeting is Pakistan. The item is prompted by recent intelligence and a rising level of tension on Pakistan's borders. There are, in effect, three basic issues or aspects of this problem: (S)

-- First, there is mounting Soviet and Afghan pressure on the northern border. (S)

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By hrt, NARA, Date 12/21/05

-- Secondly, with regard to Pakistan's border with India, there is a family of disagreements including Sikh unrest in the Punjab, incidents along the ceasefire line in Kashmir and evidence of increasing concern in India over Pakistan's nuclear programs. (S)

-- Thirdly, our relationship with Pakistan is affected by both of the foregoing problems. While we want to assist Pakistan in coping with the increased pressure on the northern border, if the evidence of progress on nuclear weapons development continues, we will face difficulty in the Congress in sustaining our security assistance. (S)

We do not assign a high probability to either a major Soviet escalation or Indian pre-emptive action in the short term. We cannot relax our efforts in the face of these developments, however. Even if we do not see an imminent threat of great violence, there may be an opportunity here for us to do something supportive such as accelerating deliveries of military equipments or demonstrating support by means of force deployments. That said, the Pakistanis must understand that we cannot sustain our security relationship unless they agree to safeguards for their nuclear facilities. In the short term, we think that Pakistan's need for our support might overcome some of Zia's reluctance to safeguard his nuclear facilities. I'd like to turn now to Bill Casey for a summary of the intelligence. (S)

Director Casey: Mr. President, the Intelligence Community believes that the more imminent problem which Pakistan faces is also the more limited one of increased Soviet/Afghan pressure on the northwestern border. As you know, between August 13-23 there has been a spate of border incidents in the wake of high level Soviet warnings to the Government of Pakistan. (S)

There has been a steady level of pressure confined to the frontier region. Intensified Soviet activities have lead Zia to take some measures to remove the immediate causes for Soviet pressure. Zia has not responded forcibly to provocation on the border. We believe he will have to respond if the air attacks intensify. We do not think that Zia will, in any case, agree to abandon his support for the Afghan insurgents. (S)

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Secretary Shultz: As you know, Mr. President, we have made quite a few demarches to the Paks on this nuclear problem including your own during the Zia visit, mine and a number by Ambassador Hinton. I think that we need to cover the open space which remains; that is, the level of enriched uranium. We need to do more in light of the Cranston amendment. (S)

We ought to get off a letter to Zia from you reemphasizing the importance and seeking Zia's commitment in writing to formally accept what he conveyed orally to Deane Hinton, namely that he would not enrich above the 5% level. He has made the commitment once, but it has not been reaffirmed since. We should note that you have laid down a number of red lines to Zia on nuclear development and they have not been crossed. Zia needs to understand that he must commit to limits on enrichment and that this must be done quickly if we are to save our security assistance program for Pakistan from Congressional assaults. (TS)

Your message should have that element--expression of continued support--and our willingness to continue to provide security assistance. At the same time, Zia should understand that there is a serious question as to whether we can continue to provide assistance. A letter such as this needs to be crafted. It's tough, and the most difficult problem is how hard a marker we should put down on enrichment above the 5% level. No one is advocating an irrevocable "red line" or a warning..."if you cross it then...". We will prepare such a letter through the interagency process for your approval. (TS)

At another level, we have made a strong statement on increasing cross border incursions. We have told the Soviets to stop this activity. We believe it would be well to call in the Soviet man in charge here at the Embassy and tell him directly how seriously we view this situation. We are also working with the Chinese. Hummel is talking to--working with--the Chinese on this problem, although I don't have a readout yet on those discussions. (S)

Mr. McFarlane: Of course, there is a problem with going to Zia and asking him not to go above the 5% level. His response is likely to be, "That's OK from your point of view, but you don't face the threat on both my borders." He might well ask, "But what have you done for me lately?" (TS)

Secretary Weinberger: I agree that we should make a further case to Zia to dissuade him from going above the 5% level. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Our focus with Zia

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should be on the difficult time we're going to have in Congress and with U.S. public opinion unless there is a foundation which allays fears about Pakistan's intention in the nuclear field. In my mind, we should outline to Zia what we are prepared to do right now by way of increased assistance: (S)

- We can accelerate deliveries of M-48 tanks in the pipeline. (S)
- We can commit to selling AIM-9L--up to 30 missiles--in two weeks. (S)
- We could get him a demonstration of AWACS-type aircraft to show him what they could do for him. (S)
- We can increase the number of ranking U.S. military visitors. (S)
- Finally, we can use our good offices to persuade other friendly countries to show their support. (S)

Frankly, this is all very critical because our response will affect our future relations with Pakistan. It will also affect our programs with the Chinese. Congress is already balking at our nuclear cooperation with the Chinese because of their Pakistani connection. (S)

We need to let the Paks know that we need agreement on the nuclear field as a foundation for doing other things. (S)

General Vessey: While I support the list of military assistance measures, we should recognize that Zia is not enthusiastic about our presence in Pakistan or exercises with U.S. forces. He wants help in the form of hardware. (S)

It is important to remember that Zia has not crossed any of the red lines we have established. Moreover, we feel confident that we will know if he does cross them. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I'd like to inject a note of caution on the items for Pakistan which Cap listed. Namely, we should avoid items that will require Congressional notification. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: I agree and the items on that list I gave will not require notification. If we send only 30 AIM-9Ls, which is all they can use, we'll be under the threshold. Ultimately, we will have to consult with the Congress and Zia needs to know that we will need reciprocity from him if we are going to get Congressional support. (S)

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Secretary Shultz: We just don't need any more "handles" for the Congress to get a hold of. (S)

The Vice President: I have one question about that list of equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If we go with a big program of assistance for Pakistan, does this endanger the Paks particularly in the time between its announcement and when the equipment gets there? (S)

Mr. McFarlane: That is a key point and it argues all the more for getting a commitment on the 5% ceiling. We could also go to India to explain that what we are doing for Pakistan is not directed at India. Of course, the air defense deployment (AWACS) might deter an Indian strike, but it could also arouse antagonism. Mr. President, we owe you the content of a demarche we could deliver to the Pakistanis. We will get it to you early next week. (TS)

General Vessey: I'd like to say one more thing on the Vice President's point. [REDACTED]

Moreover, if I were Zia, I would worry that my refusal to accept limits on nuclear programs might result in an attack. (S)

The President: Before we leave this subject, I just want to say that I worry about the possibility the Soviets may think we are idle in the face of their pressure on Pakistan. The Soviets could misread us and be tempted to do something serious leaving us the choice of not responding or going to war. (TS)

Secretary Shultz: That is why I made the point on the need for direct demarche to the Soviets. I know we didn't discuss it, but... (S)

The President: (Turning to Secretary Shultz) That's right, I agree we should do that. (S)

Mr. McFarlane: I think Ken Adelman wanted to make a point. (U)

Mr. Adelman: I just wanted to stress that red lines do work. If we are going to continue our relationship with Pakistan, we're going to need a commitment from Pakistan. It won't work if they continue to store enriched uranium. (S)

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Mr. McFarlane: Mr. President, we want to move now to the second subject on the agenda. Following the completion of a year-long review of our strategy for the Middle East (NSDD 4-82), you signed a National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-99, which outlined our strategy for dealing with major Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia. The directive also called for a detailed analysis of our military capabilities to cope with such a contingency. (S)

The analysis called for in NSDD-99 has been completed and we want to review for you the major findings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

These are not easy questions. We are not looking for any decisions today, but we need to think about our options. I'd like to turn first to Bill Casey for an update on the threat we face in this part of the world. (S)

Director Casey: Mr. President, the Soviets have given a lot of attention to this part of the world. They have over 25 active divisions committed to this problem. They have a very active advisory and support effort underway in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Iraq. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets have problems. The terrain is very demanding and their tactical air cover from the the Soviet Union is limited. Logistics support would be very difficult. (S)

We believe that, if the United States attempted to land forces in Iran on warning, for example, the Soviets would very likely invoke the 1921 Treaty with Iran and invade at least the northern provinces including Tehran. (S)

They could do this with 5-7 divisions from the Soviet Union on short notice and they could go overland from Afghanistan. A full-scale invasion with 20-25 divisions would take at least a month to prepare and the operation would take more than 3 months to reach the Gulf. (S)

We think a major Soviet invasion toward the Gulf is unlikely today. The leadership problem in the USSR is a factor as are their problems in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Soviets stubbed their toe in Iran as the Tudeh party has been driven underground. (S)

[REDACTED] On the diplomatic front, they are hard at work trying to extend their influence throughout the area. (TS)

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- In about a year, we expect to see the Syrians in control of the SA-5 systems, but there will be a significant residual Soviet presence for maintenance and support. (S)
- In Kuwait, the Soviets have established an air defense agreement and will provide major weapons in return for barter agreements. (S)
- We expect King Hussein to travel to Moscow soon to conclude a major weapons deal with the Soviets. (S)
- The Soviets have agreed to exchange Ambassadors with Egypt, and we think they will try to increase their influence there. (S)

Mr. McFarlane: In short, Mr. President, we face two dilemmas. On one hand, we have Arab states who are very interested in deterrence but do not want to plan or cooperate with us in a visible way. On the other hand, our European friends, who are even more dependent on the resources than we, want us to do all the work to protect the resources. They certainly want us to make the investments. (S)

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We need to think more about what we can do to bridge the gap between our willingness and our capabilities. Secretary Shultz could you elaborate on the strategic and political context. (S)

Secretary Shultz: Mr. President, as I see it, there are three different but related strands which together comprise the strategy. (U)

First, protecting oil. We've had a lot of diplomatic activity and some military activity to reassure the Saudis, Kuwaitis, etc. Our initiatives, coupled with the soft oil market, and our confidence in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve have calmed the situation down. (S)

On the whole, I think we have been successful--together with others--to insulate the Iranian threat and to keep it from becoming an East-West issue. It's always possible that the situation could explode, but thus far, we've been effective. (S)

The second strand is Iran. Iran is, in many respects, the most important country in the region. Once it was a very positive faction where our interests were concerned, now Iran is largely neutral between the Soviets and us. (S)

We want to prevent Soviet domination of Iran. This is a long-term battle to be waged on many fronts: political, economic, and military. We had a discussion of this problem over breakfast this morning, and we agreed on the need for more work. (S)

Given the reluctance of states in the region to cooperate with us in planning, forward basing, prepositioning, it is unrealistic at present to contemplate a forward defense in Iran. (S)

Following Bill Casey's lead, let me look at the problem more broadly--throughout the region. (U)

-- Soviet influence in the area is growing and this poses a big problem for us. The Soviets have resupplied and upgraded Syria's military capabilities, and Syria succeeded in Lebanon. We need to continue our support of Israel, which remains our closest friend in the region. We need to continue our support to the moderate Arabs, especially the Saudis but recognize there are limits to what we can do for them--all these regimes are shaky. (S)

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Our ability to do more for Jordan turns on the peace process and how to manage that. (S)

-- We work on and think about the problem all the time, and your initiative is still the best thing on the table. (S)

-- Progress, however, is all caught up in the politics of Israel. (C)

-- We need to exercise all the creativity we can muster, and we need to interlock with the new Israeli Government when that situation is better defined. (S)

-- Nothing that has happened today gives me cause for optimism though. (S)

In sum, we still have the best case to settle the problem. The Soviets have nothing constructive to offer. They exploit the Arab-Israeli problem and they provide arms. The heart of our problem in the region is right there. (S)

The President: I have some thoughts on this, perhaps they sound naive: (S)

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As to Iran, whoever designed the old strategy of cooperating with Iran was on the right track. Iran used to be the "cork" in the bottle as far as Soviet expansion was concerned. The old strategy made good sense and we let it slip away. (S)

Now there is no prospect for basing in Iran, it doesn't make sense. It seems to me the current situation suggests two things: (S)

-- We've done a lot of things for the Gulf and our Arab friends. Have we done enough to make the Soviets worry about the risk of invading, the risks of war? (S)

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-- Have we given enough thought about where we could do things -- not necessarily in the Gulf -- in another theater, elsewhere on the Soviet periphery if they moved toward the Gulf? The objective would be to make the Soviets look hard over their shoulder. (TS)

Secretary Shultz: That last point leads me right back to what we could do with Pakistan or China, maybe the Cuban thing... (TS)

The President: [REDACTED]

Secretary Weinberger: I think we can do a lot in the region to slow them down. We've made progress after all. (S)

We can't do much about the 25 division threat without Allied help. (S)

I've tried to get the NATO Allies to do more and to worry about the out of area problem. (S)

We've increased and demonstrated our readiness to respond to Arab requests for assistance. (TS)

We have a terribly difficult but basic problem. The Arabs want our help, they need it, but they don't want to be seen with us because of the Arab-Israeli issue. (S)

Your peace initiative is very important in this respect. (TS)

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We have to work on the peace initiative. We got sidetracked in Lebanon and the need to solve that problem before we got to the broader peace process. (TS)

Now that is behind us and we need to get the peace initiative back on the front burner. (TS)

Having said all that, there are a number of things we can do and a number that we've already done. Jack Vessey will brief in

detail but to summarize, we've improved our mobility, we've established a command, we have done exercises. (S)

In a nutshell, we need to get more Arab-American cooperation; we need to get that afloat headquarters ashore. (C)

The President: Before Jack briefs us, let me just say one thing. (U)

[REDACTED]

General Vessey: Provided a briefing on relative distances between U.S. and Persian Gulf. (U)

Highlighted topographical problems which confronts Soviets and U.S. forces. (S)

Stressed limitations on operations owing to primitive and limited infrastructure. (U)

Noted that U.S. will have warning of Soviet action owing to limited number of ready Soviet forces. (S)

Stressed that U.S. strategy is a strategy of deterrence. (C)

Noted progress made in consultations with Arabs (concern about Iranian threat). (C)

Pointed out that we need access and combined planning to get beyond a strategy of deterrence. Noted that we are unlikely to get more cooperation from Arabs until progress is made on peace initiative. (S)

Noted that we are getting more cooperation from Allies (pointed out that UK and French have more ships in the Northern Arabian Sea at present than ever before). (C)

Stressed that cooperation with Turkey is the "absolute key." Greek problem and "Greek lobby" on Hill are comparable obstacles to cooperation as Arab-Israeli problem and friends of Israel in Congress complicate cooperation with the Arabs. (S)

The President: The Turks are critical in one other respect. They are formidable fighters. Remember their contribution during the Korean War and their behavior as POWs. (C)

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Mr. McFarlane: To summarize: ~~(S)~~

Mr. President, we have a lot more work to do. ~~(S)~~

-- We need to enlist others for the defense of the oil. ~~(S)~~

-- We need to get more cooperation from friends and Allies. ~~(S)~~

-- We will continue our work. ~~(S)~~

I'd like to turn briefly to Don Regan, who has a couple of points. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Regan: I'd like to make just a couple of points. ~~(S)~~

First, in our relations with Pakistan, we need to keep the economic dimension of the Pakistani's plight in mind. ~~(S)~~

India [REDACTED] Since 1964 they have received more than \$15 billion in aid from the World Bank and the IMF. Pakistan by contrast has received only \$2 billion. ~~(S)~~

In the Middle East, the problem is oil. But oil might be Iran's achilles heel; without the sale of oil, they would go bankrupt. ~~(S)~~

We ought to think more about how we can use oil for deterrence. ~~(S)~~

As to Israel and prospects for a working coalition, the first problem any government is going to have to tackle is the economy. In brief, Israel is about to become an economic basket case. I'll give them a couple of weeks before a crisis hits hard. They are going to be looking to us for assistance and lots of it. ~~(C)~~

The President: How much worse can it get. How far can they slide before they are like Germany in the 20's. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Shultz: I think they are already there. They are already a "basket case." Once this new government is in place, we are going to have work with them on reforms. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Weinberger: And this ties in to the other problems. The reason they have such a nightmare with their economy is that they are trying to defend all of their borders with the Arabs. That is why a peaceful resolution of the problem is so important. ~~(C)~~

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The President: That was always my thinking regarding the importance of the peace initiative for Israel's future. It would allow them to reduce the amount of their budget given to armaments. ~~(C)~~

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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 5, 1984

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

PHILIP A. DUR *Phil*

SUBJECT:

Minutes of NSPG Meeting: Pakistan and the
NSDD-99 Work Program

Attached at Tab I for your approval are the minutes for the NSPG meeting of August 31, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the *f* minutes at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Minutes of NSPG Meeting of August 31, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/6/00

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