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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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NLS 598-004 #100

BY CAS NARA, DATE 7/14/00

CO167

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: November 15, 1986
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

- I. PURPOSE: To continue your close, personal consultations with Mrs. Thatcher, with a focus on arms control.
- II. BACKGROUND: You last met with Mrs. Thatcher at the Tokyo Summit. She is nearing her 12th year as leader of the Conservative Party -- the last 7½ years of which she has been Prime Minister. While her Parliamentary majority remains secure, her uncompromising personal style, long tenure in office, and continuing economic problems -- especially high unemployment (over 11 percent) -- have led to much criticism.

Nonetheless, after trailing Labor for more than a year by 4 to 6 percentage points in the polls, Mrs. Thatcher and the Tories are all of a sudden riding high -- neck and neck, or even slightly ahead of Labor. There is thus much speculation that she will call elections next Spring, though her mandate runs to June 1988.

While she remains one of your most ardent supporters, Mrs. Thatcher is concerned about the strategic implications of your Reykjavik proposals. She requested this meeting well before your meeting with Gorbachev. But Mrs. Thatcher is clearly coming to seek reassurances about Reykjavik: in particular, that strategic reductions (especially the elimination of ballistic missiles) will not undercut deterrence and will not overlook the conventional imbalance in Europe; and reassurances that our negotiating proposals will not put in question the UK Trident program and undermine her reelection chances.

You will recall she spoke to you on the phone about her concerns, the day after Reykjavik. Specifically, she questions whether we can have effective deterrence without ballistic missiles. She does not believe it prudent to make major reductions without redressing conventional and chemical weapons imbalances. Mrs. Thatcher also fears that elimination of ballistic missiles will undercut her domestic political position. Her main rival, Labor -- under Neil Kinnock -- advocates that Britain give up its independent nuclear force and remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from British soil. This would deal a severe blow to NATO. We,

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and our Allies, need to speak out with one voice and one theme on the adverse consequences of Labor's security policies. How we do it, however, is a delicate matter.

Earlier in the week, I sent you a background paper that addressed Mrs. Thatcher's special concerns in some detail. I have also enclosed (at Tab C) full talking points that explain your Reykjavik proposals and respond directly to her concerns. We also have incorporated their central thrust in your talking point cards (at Tab B).

Some of Mrs. Thatcher's concerns are shared by other European Allies. You will recall that Kohl raised similar points. Indeed, there are reports that the British, French, Germans, and Italians have launched a new effort to better coordinate their arms control positions. Therefore, it would be useful for you to stress to Mrs. Thatcher that you have no intention of abandoning nuclear deterrence, which will not be altered by the elimination of ballistic missiles. Our remaining strategic nuclear retaliatory forces -- although smaller and of a different composition -- would be facing a much smaller Soviet threat without fast flying ballistic missiles and, therefore, would be a stronger deterrent. As long as the Soviets lead in ballistic missiles, and we retain our technological lead in bombers and cruise missiles, eliminating ballistic missiles -- while maintaining the nuclear deterrent -- is to our advantage.

You will, as well, want to emphasize that prospects for cuts in nuclear arms make it all the more important to pursue conventional force reductions on a sound basis. You will recall there is a disagreement over the best forum for any new "Atlantic-to-the Urals" negotiations. We and our European partners want to include the French -- they are not involved in the current, more limited MBFR talks. But while we believe the negotiations must be Alliance-to-Alliance, with instructions decided by NATO, the French -- with some European support -- desire negotiations under the far less structured CSCE framework. We are working with Allies, like Mrs. Thatcher, to move the French to an acceptable compromise.

On other arms control matters, Mrs. Thatcher has been critical of the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and of our plans to exceed the SALT II numerical sublimits. The press prematurely reported that we would break out of SALT numerical constraints this week. We do not, however, expect her to spend much time on ABM and SALT, given Soviet violations.

Earlier this week, I sent you a background paper addressing the complexities and competing interests in our trilateral US-UK-Argentine relationship. Our relations with Britain --

and your close personal relationship with Mrs. Thatcher -- in a broad sense stand in the way of our efforts to strengthen Argentina's burgeoning democracy. While Mrs. Thatcher recognizes the benefits of a democratic Argentina, she has been unyielding on entering any negotiations that conceivably could address sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas. She also has steadfastly refused to approve the transfer of major arms to Argentina.

Britain's recent unilateral declaration of a fisheries protection zone around the Falklands -- and Argentina's strong reaction -- offer an opportunity for you to stress the importance we attach to democracy in Argentina. While we clearly do not want to make things more difficult for her domestically, you will want to tell Mrs. Thatcher that we cannot continually put off how best to nurture Argentina's democracy. And that sooner rather than later, we will want to return to the question of military aircraft for Argentina. You should expect a typical Thatcher barrage.

Terrorism will likely also be high on her agenda. This is an area in which our "special relationship" takes on a true meaning -- there is real cooperation and commonality of views. On Monday, the EC -- except for Greece -- announced, at British urging, joint measures against Syria. We are announcing our measures against Syria later this week. You will want to applaud her strong stance against terrorism and stress the need for similar cooperation from other Europeans.

There are indications that she may wish to discuss briefly the Middle East and South Africa. In both areas, the thrust will be on the need to continue to work closely together as we look for ways to promote peaceful progress. George's scope paper (at Tab A) addresses these issues and provides additional insights on other aspects of the agenda.

Unlike some of your earlier meetings, there is no burning bilateral matter (e.g., civil aviation). She did, however, just write you to express concern over increased protectionist pressures in the U.S. Specifically, she objected to the provision in the Superfund legislation which introduces differential tax treatment between domestic and imported oil. Britain, of course, is an oil exporter. You will want to acknowledge her letter.

Visits like Mrs. Thatcher's form the essence of consultations to which we and our partners attach such significance. In this regard, you will recall that on her last visit to Camp David (December 1984) she obtained our agreement to make four points -- in her press conference -- characterizing common views about the purpose of SDI. They were: 1) we do not seek superiority; 2) SDI deployment is a matter for negotiation; 3) our objective is to enhance deterrence; and 4) negotiations with the Soviets (which were about to resume)

are aimed at achieving security at reduced levels of offensive systems. Given her concerns today, and the changed climate since December 1984, the last point, in particular, sounds somewhat hollow.

Nonetheless, she may make a similar effort this year. We have queried the British, and her top aides insist she has no plans to propose a joint statement. However, they leave the door slightly ajar, by saying that should discussions lead to the development of common points for public use, they would not object. We, however, have found that in most cases -- even with friends like Mrs. Thatcher -- that joint statements, which are usually a compromise, do not serve our policy interests. Hence, we are watching this carefully and will give you an update at the prebrief. Just in case, State and my staff are preparing contingency points.

III. PARTICIPANTS: Informal Cocktails and Working Lunch

U.S.

The President
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Charles Price
Asst. Secretary Rozanne L. Ridgway
Peter R. Sommer, NSC

U.K.

Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Antony Acland
Private Secretary Powell

IV. PRESS PLAN: White House photographers at appropriate points during Camp David schedule. Pool press coverage of Mrs. Thatcher's arrival.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

10:45	Camp David	Mrs. Thatcher arrives
10:50-11:50	Aspen Cabin	Private meeting with Mrs. Thatcher
11:50-12:00		Walk from Aspen to Laurel Cabin
12:06-12:11	Laurel Cabin	Make weekly radio address from Conference Room, with Mrs. Thatcher present
12:15-12:30	Laurel Cabin	Informal cocktails all participants
12:30-1:30	Laurel Cabin	Working lunch -- all participants
1:40		Mrs. Thatcher departs

Attachments

Tab A Shultz' scope paper and Thatcher's Bio
Tab B Talking Points
Tab C Detailed Arms Control Talking Points

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

November 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: *Frank Lavin* FRANK LAVIN/PETER *Peter* PETER

Deputy Nati Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Thatcher Visit

We need to nail down the scenario for the Thatcher visit. Jim Kuhn has taken a strong, personal interest in the arrangements, since he will be at Camp David and he was the one who organized her December 1984 visit there.

Kuhn has made it clear that the President wishes to honor Mrs. Thatcher's request for a private meeting and to keep the numbers very small. We have consulted closely with him, and according to Jim, the President wants to start with a one-on-one, with no notetakers; and then move to a wider group at a working lunch, which will be preceded by informal cocktails. Mrs. Thatcher will be accompanied to Camp David by Ambassador Acland and her Private Secretary, Charles Powell.

We think we have done everything to accommodate the British -- indeed we cannot recall any previous meeting in which the President played such a direct role in the arrangements. The British, nonetheless, continue to want more, and Powell may call you.

The British have asked for more time -- they would like to start earlier. We see no need. We are already offering not only Camp David, but also nearly an hour longer than the time allocated in Washington for official working visits. The British have also suggested that we forego the cocktails after the tete-a-tete private meeting before lunch, in favor of a sit down session. The informal drinks apparently are a mainstay at Camp David (we did the same thing the last time she was here) and add to the informality of the Saturday session. Moreover, we are planning a real working lunch (sit down discussions) and she is having separate meetings with Shultz and Weinberger on Friday. There is also a basic principle: the President is, after all, the host.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I memo to Don Regan, reflecting the scenario the President suggested.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to Regan

JMP -
Is this
wife?
A

7
A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7588 Add-on

MEMORANDUM FOR DON REGAN

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Scenario for Thatcher Visit

Based on the President's and Mrs. Thatcher's preference for keeping the sessions private after further discussions with other White House offices (Military, Social, Press, etc.) and State, we have developed the following more detailed scenario for Mrs. Thatcher's visit to Camp David. We understand the First Lady's office will be discussing directly with Mrs. Reagan her role.

Friday, November 14

TBD Oval Office Prebrief: President,
Vice President, Shultz, Regan,
Poindexter, Ridgway, Price, Sommer

Moving the pre-brief to Friday was Jim Kuhn's suggestion, to allow the President to have a later start on Saturday morning.

Saturday, November 15

9:55	Pentagon	State 2 helicopter departs for Camp David: Lavin, Rick Riley, UK Support (1), SS (5)
10:00	Observatory	Mrs. Thatcher finishes breakfast with the Vice President
10:10	Observatory	State 1 departs for Camp David: Shultz, Regan, Poindexter, Ridgway, Sommer, Mrs. Thatcher, Acland, Powell, Roosevelt, SS (2), SY (1), Scotland Yard (1) (Price already at Camp David)
10:45	Camp David	Mrs. Thatcher arrives (press pool coverage)
10:50-11:50	Aspen Cabin	The President and Mrs. Thatcher <u>only</u> meet

11:50-12:00	Camp David	The President and Mrs. Thatcher walk from Aspen to Laurel Cabin
12:06-12:11	Laurel Cabin	The President makes his weekly radio address from Conference Room, with Mrs. Thatcher present as a spectator.
12:15-12:30	Laurel Cabin	Informal cocktails for all participants
12:30-1:30	Laurel Cabin	Working lunch: The President, Shultz, Regan, Poindexter, Price, Ridgway and Sommer; Mrs. Thatcher, Ambassador Acland, and Private Secretary Powell
1:40	Camp David	Mrs. Thatcher departs

-- Mrs. Thatcher will hold a press conference at the British Embassy upon her return. Roz Ridgway will give a read-out in the White House Briefing Room.

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	A
Rodney McDaniel	2	M	
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel	4	(R)	
Paul Thompson	3	S	
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter	5	✓	A
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	6		N
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be ~~seen~~ ^{sent to DTR} by: COB 11/12
(Date/Time)

~~MEMO~~
Memo from JIMP to DTR on Thatcher visit arrangements.

BA