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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
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O 251530Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6769

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, GE
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN MET WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL AND CHANCELLERY SECURITY POLICY ADVISER TELTSCHIK ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 25. HE PROVIDED A BRIEF UPDATE ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, NOTING THE REMAINING AREAS OF DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS AND ASSURING THE FRG GOVERNMENT THAT THE U.S. HAS MAINTAINED A FIRM POSITION ON EXCLUDING FRG PIA MISSILES FROM THE INF TALKS. IN HIS MEETING WITH GLITMAN, TELTSCHIK REVEALED CONSIDERABLE FRG UNEASINESS ON THE P1'S. SPEAKING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, HE SAID THE KOHL GOVERNMENT FEARED THAT THE ULTIMATE GO OR NO-GO ON AN INF TREATY WOULD HINGE ON THE 72 FRG PERSHING AND, IN A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, THE ALLIANCE WOULD LOOK TO THE FRG TO CAST THE DECIDING VOTE. TELTSCHIK INTIMATED THAT IN THE END GAME THE CDU, A BIT GUN-SHY AFTER THE HIT IT TOOK ON DOUBLE ZERO, REALLY FEARED THAT THE U.S. WOULD OVERRULE ANY FRG STAND TO KEEP ITS PERSHING, DEALING IT A SECOND CRITICAL SETBACK IN THE INF DEBATE. SPEAKING "PERSONALLY", HE PREDICTED THAT IF THE GERMAN SYSTEMS BECAME THE SOLE OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF AN INF TREATY, THE

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/19



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FRG GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO GIVE THEM UP. TELTSCHIK ASKED THAT GLITMAN STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH, PARTICULARLY IN THE DAYS AHEAD AND IN THE LIGHT OF A POSSIBLE U. S. /SOVIET MINISTERIAL MEETING IN THE MID-JULY TIMEFRAME. DURING THE EARLIER CALL ON KOHL, THE CHANCELLOR PLEDGED TO DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE NATO INF POSTURE, AND BY EXTENSION, OUR STANCE IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. HE WARNED THAT SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS WERE EXACTING A TOLL AMONG THE GERMAN PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY THE YOUNG. THIS PLUS CONTINUED EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS TO SOW MISTRUST AMONG THE ALLIES DID NOT PROVIDE THE BEST BACKGROUND FOR THE U. S. INF NEGOTIATORS TO WAGE THEIR FIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, AS HE SAW IT, THE ALLIANCE STOOD A GOOD CHANCE OF GETTING AN INF TREATY FAVORABLE TO ITS INTERESTS, "IF IT CONTINUES TO STAND FAST." KOHL WISHED PRESIDENT REAGAN WELL IN THE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE AN ACCEPTABLE INF ACCORD WITH THE SOVIETS, SAYING THAT HE REALLY WANTS A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO OCCUR ON THE PRESIDENT'S WATCH. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING HIS PRESENTATION AT THE FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION CONFERENCE ON SECURITY POLICY, AMBASSADOR GLITMAN PAID CALLS ON KOHL AND TELTSCHIK. THE LATTER ALSO SAT IN ON THE MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR. AMBASSADOR BURT AND EMBASSY OFFICER ACCOMPANIED GLITMAN.

4. IN BOTH MEETINGS, GLITMAN PROVIDED A BRIEF RUNDOWN ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET INF NEGOTIATORS. HE SAID THE TALKS WERE MOVING ALONG IN A FAIRLY GOOD AND BUSINESS-LIKE FASHION. THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF POLEMICS AND SOVIET STONEWALLING OR NITPICKING, WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REALLY WANTED AN INF TREATY. OUR ARGUMENT THAT IT MAKES CONSIDERABLE SENSE TO GO FOR A GLOBAL ZERO LRINF AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE A VERIFICATION REGIME, IS INCREASINGLY CATCHING THE SOVIETS'

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ATTENTION. WHILE THERE REMAINED IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES TO SORT OUT, MOST NOTABLY VERIFICATION AND A REDUCTIONS SCHEDULE, THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INF ACCORD LOOKED GOOD. STILL, WE COULD NOT SAY THAT CONCLUSION OF A TREATY WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. IMPORTANT TRENCH WORK LAY AHEAD.

GLITMAN'S TASK WAS THEREFORE A TOUGH AND VERY IMPORTANT

5. GLITMAN STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD OF LATE ZEROED IN ON THE 72 FRG PERSHING 1A'S, ARGUING THAT U.S. CUSTODY OF THE WARHEADS MADE THEM U.S. SYSTEMS AND THEREFORE SUITABLE FOR INCLUSION IN AN INF TREATY. OUR RESPONSE HAS REMAINED FIRM AND CONSISTENT: THESE ARE GERMAN MISSILES AND THEREFORE ANY DECISION ON KEEPING AND/OR MODERNIZING THEM IS AN ISSUE FOR THE FRG GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT ANY FRG DECISION IN THIS REGARD AND REJECTS THIS SOVIET 11TH HOUR ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE THE FRG PERSHING IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. GLITMAN SAID HE HAD TAKEN AN EQUALLY FIRM LINE THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF COOPERATION WITH THE FRG, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MODERNIZED PERSHING MISSILES IF THE FRG DECIDES IN FAVOR OF MODERNIZATION.

TELTSCHIK ASKED WHETHER IF IT CAME DOWN TO THE SINGLE

6. CHANCELLOR KOHL AGREED WITH GLITMAN'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED AN INF TREATY. ALL INDICATIONS POINTED TO A STRONG GORBACHEV DESIRE TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. NOW, MORE THAN EVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO STAND AS ONE AND SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. KOHL SAID THAT HE WANTED THIS PRESIDENT TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN REACHING AN INF AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS

AND PLEDGED HIS STRONG SUPPORT IN MAKING THIS POSSIBLE.

7. KOHL STATED THAT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SETTING WAS NOT THE MOST FAVORABLE TO THE U.S. INF NEGOTIATORS. PUBLIC ATTITUDES, PARTICULARLY AMONG MANY GERMAN YOUTHS UNDER AGE 21, FAVORED GORBACHEV OVER REAGAN ON INF. ADDED TO THIS WAS THE ABSURD SPECTACLE OF SPD LEADER EGON BAHR COMPARING

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GORBACHEV TO PETER THE GREAT. SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WAS
MAKING INROADS IN PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE. AN ADDITIONAL
PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUALLY SOUGHT TO SOW
MISTRUST AMONG THE NATO ALLIES, REQUIRING US ALL TO STAY
IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER AND MAINTAIN CONSENSUS.
GLITMAN'S TASK WAS THEREFORE A TOUGH AND VERY IMPORTANT
ONE. KOHL REITERATED HIS OFFER TO SUPPORT THE U.S. IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS AS REQUIRED AND ASKED THAT GLITMAN
"DISCREETLY KEEP US INFORMED."

8. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR, GLITMAN MET
WITH TELTSCHIK, WHO WAS JOINED BY CHANCELLERY AIDES COL
SHEFFER AND KAESTNER. TELTSCHIK ADDRESSED THE PIA ISSUE.
HE SAID THIS ISSUE INCREASINGLY LOOMED AS POTENTIALLY THE
ONLY OBSTACLE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF AN INF
TREATY. THE U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF DOUBLE ZERO AND THE
INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GO FOR GLOBAL ZERO ON
LRINF, WHICH LIKELY WILL REMOVE VERIFICATION AS A SERIOUS
PROBLEM, QUICKENS THE PACE AND RAISES EXPECTATIONS THAT AN
INF TREATY CAN AND WILL BE CONCLUDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
TELTSCHIK ASKED WHETHER, IF IT CAME DOWN TO THE SINGLE
ISSUE OF THE GERMAN PERSHINGS, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR THE
FRG GOVERNMENT TO BLOCK THE ACCORD BY CONTINUED INSISTENCE
THAT THE 72 PIA'S BE KEPT OUT OF THE AGREEMENT. AS
TELTSCHIK PUT IT, THE FRG GOVERNMENT DREADED THAT EVENTS
MIGHT UNFOLD IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE FRG WOULD SUDDENLY BE
THRUST ONTO CENTER STAGE AND ASKED WHETHER IT WILL BLOCK
THE TREATY THROUGH INSISTENCE THAT THE P1'S BE KEPT OUT.

9. THE FRG (AND THE ALLIANCE) POSITION THAT THE GERMAN
PERSHINGS NOT BE A PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE
UPHELD IF THIS HAPPENED, ACCORDING TO TELTSCHIK. HE
INTIMATED THAT THE CDU FACTION FURTHER FEARED THE U.S.
WOULD MUSCLE THE FRG INTO AGREEING TO GIVE UP THE SYSTEMS,
FOR THE SAKE OF THE TREATY. ON THE HEELS OF A LOSS IN THE
DOUBLE ZERO DEBATE, THE CONSERVATIVES WOULD NOT STAND FOR

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A SECOND STRAIGHT DEFEAT ON INF.

10. SPEAKING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE (PROTECT), TELTSCHIK SAID THAT PERSONALLY HE BELIEVED IF THE FRG WAS THROWN INTO THIS SITUATION, IT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RECONSIDER AND THROW IN THE TOWEL ON THE PIA'S. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF AN INF TREATY AND WOULD, IN THE FACE OF INCREASED PRESSURE, JETTISON THE FRG PERSHING'S ISSUE FOR THE SAKE OF BROADER ALLIANCE INTERESTS. THUS, HIS BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STAND FIRM ON THE PRESENT POSITION, BUT IF IT CAME DOWN TO THE ONE ISSUE OF GERMAN PERSHING'S, WE SHOULD REVIEW AND ALTER THIS STANCE.

11. AS THE MEETING DREW TO A CLOSE, TELTSCHIK ASKED THAT GLITMAN STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH IN THE DAYS AHEAD. TELTSCHIK SAID HE HAD NO SUMMER LEAVE PLANS AND PLANNED TO BE IN BONN, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A JULY 11 TRIP TO CHINA WITH KOHL. CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY IF THE SECRETARY WAS SEEING HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART IN THE MID-JULY TIMEFRAME, AS REPORTED.

12. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH AMBASSADOR GLITMAN.

13. IF NO OBJECTIONS, DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS FOR INFO: NST GENEVA, USMISSION USNATO, AMEMBASSY LONDON AND AMBEMBASSY PARIS.

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