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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SYSTEM II  
90161 Add On

February 29, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: NELSON C. LEDSKY *uR*  
SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSPG Meeting  
on February 26, 1988 on the NATO Summit

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the NSPG held in the White House Situation Room with the President on Friday, February 26 from 11:00 a.m to 12:00 p.m.

Fritz Eimarkh *FWE/R* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached Minutes for record retention in NSC Files.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Minutes

cc: Don Mahley  
Jeremy Curtin

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

BY *anf*, NARA, Date *3/27/86*

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Declassify on: OADR



National Security Planning Group Meeting  
February 26, 11:00 a.m.-1200: p.m., WHSR

SUBJECT: NATO Summit, March 2-3, 1988, Brussels, Belgium

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President's Office  
Don Gregg

State  
Max Kampelman  
Rozanne Ridgway

OSD  
Frank C. Carlucci  
Ron Lehman

JUSTICE  
Edwin Meese

OMB  
James Miller

CIA  
William Webster  
Richard Kerr

JCS  
ADM William Crowe  
Jonathan Howe

ACDA  
Manfred Eimer

USIA  
Marvin Stone

WH  
Howard Baker  
Ken Duberstein  
Marlin Fitzwater  
Colin L. Powell  
John D. Negroponte

NSC  
Fritz Ermarth  
Nelson C. Ledsky  
Don Mahley


Minutes

The President opened the meeting by reporting that all 16 Alliance leaders would be attending the NATO Summit in Brussels on March 2-3. This would be the first full NATO Summit in six years. The Alliance had much to celebrate, including the INF Treaty, but it also had to confront some important problems. The task next week would be to keep these problems from disrupting Alliance unity. The President expressed optimism that this could be done, and that the Alliance could reaffirm its proven formula of realism, strength and patience in dealing with the East.



With respect to the preparations for the Summit, General Powell said that the two days in Brussels would be exceedingly busy. There would be three closed meetings of the 16 NATO leaders which would run 4-5 hours in total. A lunch and dinner for the 16 was also planned for March 2. Everybody seemed to want a smooth and successful Summit, but there could be problems in developing the two joint documents we want to see emerge from the sessions. One was a magisterial but general declaration. The other was a separate statement on conventional stability in Europe. Work on both texts was now proceeding in Brussels, but the right balance had not yet been struck.

Ambassador Kampelman, representing the State Department, confirmed the fact that progress on the two documents was slow. Secretary Shultz in Brussels last week, had pressed the Allies on the importance of getting the documents nailed down properly before the Summit. One had to acknowledge that the fundamental disagreement in the Alliance was on how to deal with the Soviets.



There was a general consensus that a good statement on conventional stability would be useful to the INF ratification process, and helpful, both to our further START negotiations, and the President's meeting this spring with General Secretary Gorbachev. The statement would help demonstrate that the West was strong and unified on an issue of considerable importance when serious divisions had previously been evident.

Ambassador Kampelman then outlined our arms control priorities for the year ahead in generally optimistic terms. The Soviets seemed to want to conclude agreement and in several areas, they may meet terms we never thought they would accept. Would we take "yes" for an answer? Ambassador Kampelman continued that some in Europe were nervous that the U.S. was getting too close to the Soviets. On the other hand, if we were doing nothing and not involved in active negotiations, some Europeans would also complain. The President responded that this was the natural condition of the Alliance, but that everybody should understand that he would do all that he could to reach meaningful and useful understandings with Soviets -- not for agreement's sake but for the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Secretary Carlucci then made three points. First, he urged that we seek to achieve a balanced Summit, with the arms control material matched by equal attention paid to defense issues. Unless this were achieved, the Administration will lose support in the Congress on INF and defense budget questions. Secondly,



There must be stress on modernization. There can be no backsliding and no language which suggests deferral. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The third point had to do with burdensharing. This must be stressed at the Summit, if only because Congress was watching. Two Congressional amendments, one already law, and another have to be dealt with in the months ahead. Congress will want to know how hard we have pushed burdensharing.

[REDACTED]

Marvin Stone reported on the favorable atmosphere under which the NATO Summit would be held. Public support for NATO was running very high in Europe, as was support for the INF Treaty. Most Europeans also recognized that the Treaty had been attained because NATO had deployed Pershings and cruise missiles.

Mr. Stone reported that a good deal of work had been done to publicize the NATO Summit. The President's WORLDNET speech had gone down well, and USIA had scheduled an extensive public relations program to follow-up on the Summit.

The President concluded the meeting by saying that he felt comfortable about the preparations for the Summit. Our objective must be to convince our Allies to keep up their defense expenditures. We must all go through the motion of convincing the Soviets we are serious, and will maintain our guard. In the final analysis, the President said, he did not think General Secretary Gorbachev wanted to engage in an arms race with the United States, but our task was to convince him not to try.

Secretary Carlucci repeated that our Congress wants to see action by our European Allies. It was clear that to get action we will have to push.

Admiral Crowe agreed, and said that if we wanted additional defense spending in this country, we must convince our Allies to do more.

General Powell summed up by talking about preparations for the President's intervention on the first day of the Summit. The text was well along, and needed to be cleared by State and Defense. More material would have to be put into the intervention concerning defense and the West's need for an active public diplomacy effort to counter the Soviet propaganda campaign in Western Europe.